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Achieve the Promise—and Limit the Risk—
of Multi-Participant Trusts
John P.C. Duncan and Anita M. Sarafa*
The authors observe the robust trend toward creating “multi-participant trusts” and review the challenges to achieving the promise of this
powerful arrangement while limiting its risks. The article demonstrates
that a multi-participant trust requires a structuring of relationships by the
trust instrument—a coordination and governance structure—not needed
for a traditional trust and including elements not supplied by any state’s
law.
The authors’ review of the current state of the law governing multiple
trust participants discloses abounding uncertainties, gaps and substantive
issues. They provide a “sampler” of problems that already have arisen
from shortcomings in current law and in trust instruments failing adequately to specify participants’ duties, performance standards, liability for
losses or how they can work together.
The authors conclude that careful and knowledgeable draftsmanship
must substitute for more coherent law at least until the main uncertainties
and other negatives are eliminated. Even then, the promise of these trusts
will only be fulfilled by skilled trust counsel improving upon constraining
default rules in state law and supplying a necessary governance structure.
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1 Rachel Emma Silverman, How Many Trustees Do You Need?, WALL ST. J., July
12, 2007, at B5 available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118420240601164112.html.
2 See generally Dennis Belcher, Not My Fault – The Devil Made Me Do It! Responsibilities and Duties of a Delegating or Directed Trustee, 41 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST.
ON EST. PLAN. ch. 13 (2007); Ann Hart Wernz, Directed Trustees: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Issues of Liability of Co-Trustees and Successor Trustees, 2004.3 NOTRE
DAME TAX & EST. PLAN. INST. § 30 (2004); Dennis Belcher, David Pankey & Ann Hart
Wernz, Directed Trustees, Co-Trustees, and Successor Trustees – Fiduciary and Regulatory
Issues, 41 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. Special Session III-C (2007); Peter
S. Gordon, Directed Trusts: The Use of Trust Advisors and Protectors: Can Fiduciaries
Limit Liability Through Directed Trusts? Empowering Trust Protectors While Minimizing Their Liability, Or Can a House Divided Long Stand?, 2006.2 NOTRE DAME TAX &
EST. PLAN. INST. § PSG-18 (2006).
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Not too long ago, a Wall Street Journal article addressed the question of “How many trustees do you need?” The author observed that
“as trusts become more complex and investing strategies become more
sophisticated, more well-off families are using teams of multiple trustees
and advisors, each with very specific roles and responsibilities . . . . Families are ‘slicing and dicing’ trustee duties.”1 We discuss below the many
reasons for the robust trend toward using what we first dubbed in 2007
as “multi-participant trusts.” We also review the common law and, for
key states, statutes governing trusts with multiple participants and find
that, as with most trends in the trust world, law and best practices are
struggling to keep pace.
In recent years, several commentators have addressed unique and
important legal issues for trusts with multiple participants, especially
those involving directed trustees.2 But little has been written to date
regarding the problem trust counsel and participants themselves face in
assuring that such trusts will ultimately achieve settlors’ aims by striking
an appropriate balance between those original aims and the evolving
needs of the beneficiaries these trusts are intended to further as well as
the needs of the participants charged with implementing the trusts for
well-defined, readily-understandable roles they can perform competently and efficiently and without unknown or unreasonable exposures
to liability.
Achieving all parties’ aims must be predicated on effective coordination and cooperation among multiple trust participants in pursuit of a
common goal—achieving the purposes of the trust in the best interests
of its beneficiaries. It also requires adequate incentives to trust participants coupled with known and manageable exposures only to reasonable risks for all concerned. Lastly, achieving the promise these trusts
hold requires trust counsel not only to fix problems created by the law
but also to take advantage of opportunities provided by the law, such as

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 55 Side A

08/05/2011 14:05:14

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\36-4\ACT403.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 5

2-AUG-11

MULTI-PARTICIPANT TRUSTS

10:44

773

08/05/2011 14:05:14

1. Identifying unique trust implementation issues that can
and have resulted from the proliferation of multi-participant trusts;
2. Reviewing the current state of the law governing duties,
responsibilities, liability and coordination of activities of
multiple trust participants;
3. Assessing where trust drafting needs to substitute for inadequate or unfavorable law;
4. Showing how the multi-participant trust requires a structuring of relationships—in a word, governance—not necessary for a single-fiduciary trust; and suggesting the
essential structuring elements that are not found in the law

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 55 Side A

improving upon default choices that may be adequate, but only
adequate.
We address the issues in this quickly evolving area of trust law in
part by identifying the current state of the law and the legal uncertainties, gaps and substantive issues that still exist. We find that thoughtful
and prudent draftsmanship will have to substitute for more coherent
law, at least until the main uncertainties and other negatives have been
eliminated. Both solving the coordination issues and overcoming laws
that are inimical to the purposes of the trust are within the province of
trust counsel but present her with significant challenges.
We also suggest that many coordination issues cannot be “fixed” by
statutory mandates, at least not without materially limiting the very flexibility that has been the major impetus for creating trusts built around
multiple trust participants. The need for skillful, well-informed drafting
will remain even after the law has resolved problems where it can most
helpfully do so, primarily by providing more sensible default duties and
responsibilities among multiple trust participants. Consequently, we
point out issues left open or currently addressed unhelpfully by the law
and which therefore must be resolved by the trust instrument itself. In
addition, we point out opportunities to take advantage of flexible laws,
especially those that allow settlors to override almost every common law
rule or statutory default.
We also consider the trust implementation, administration and,
most uniquely, governance issues not present in a single, traditional, allpowerful-trustee trust. These issues, too, can only be addressed in the
instrument governing a multi-participant trust, a state of affairs that is
unlikely to change even when the law governing this area has matured.
To summarize, we had five objectives for this article, all for the purpose of helping achieve the promise of multi-participant trusts while
limiting the risks for participants and fiduciary assets:
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and hence must be supplied by the trust instrument itself;
and
5. Providing suggested approaches including suggested language for the draftsman confronting the challenges identified by the foregoing inquiries.
We conclude that in order for multi-participant trusts to function as
intended and achieve their settlors’ objectives, trust counsel must address several challenges not present (or not at least to the same high
degree) with the classic, single-fiduciary trust. These include determining and specifying in the trust instrument (a) the exact duties of each
trust participant, (b) the standards that should apply to each participant,
(c) their liability for losses to the trust or beneficiaries arising from a
failure to fulfill a duty, and (d) how the participants should work
together.
I. TREND TOWARD MULTI-PARTICIPANT TRUSTS
A. Contributing Factors

1. Co-Trustee Legacy

3

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF

TRUSTS § 33(1) cmt. a. (2003).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

The longest standing examples of administration of trusts by multiple-participants involve co-trustees. Historically, co-trustees have been
used most often, but not exclusively, in the corporate trust world to
overcome geographical barriers to a single trustee’s administering property in multiple jurisdictions.3 In other words, they were employed because the primary trustee was not legally competent to act outside the

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 55 Side B

There has been a proliferation of trusts with new participants that
are required to act under a trust in addition to or in place of the traditional, plenipotent trustee. These can include co-trustees, directed trustees, trust advisors for investment and other functions, trust protectors,
distribution advisors and committees, removers and appointers.
The primary developments contributing to this trend are dramatic
recent changes in trust law, distrust of traditional trustees, a desire to
relieve trustees of liability, growing sophistication and complexity in the
investment world, growing assertiveness among settlors and families
seeking to exercise greater control over certain trust functions, growth
in dynasty trusts, special purpose trusts requiring special expertise to
administer, federal tax law limits on family involvement in distribution
decisions and vigorous competition between several states for trust business. Multi-participant trusts are being fashioned to address each of the
foregoing opportunities and challenges.
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state of its residence or chartering. More recently, co-trustees have
sometimes been used to provide special competence not possessed by
the primary trustee (such as investment expertise) or to make distribution decisions that a settlor- or beneficiary-related primary trustee cannot make without a conflict of interest or adverse tax consequences.
Because of the negatives associated with co-trustees with powers
and responsibilities that are legally co-extensive with the primary trustee’s, their use has been giving way to the use of trust advisors and trust
protectors with narrower authority and responsibilities tailored to their
intended limited functions. But much of the sparse case law in this area
remains rooted in the co-trustee, shared-responsibility model.
2. Modern Trust Statutes
A suite of modern trust laws granting trustees more authority and
flexibility in the administration of trusts has been a major contributor to
the multi-trust-participant trend. These laws include the Prudent Investor Act and various new Principal and Income Acts incorporating power
to adjust or unitrust conversion features. These acts give trustees the
flexibility to invest according to modern portfolio theory and to adopt
new criteria for distributions. A not-wholly-unintended—but certainly
not-wholly-anticipated—result of this flexibility is that there is now a
need to bring to trust administration a higher level of financial expertise
and a greater focus on the needs and circumstances of individual
beneficiaries.
3. Modern Portfolio Theory
30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 56 Side A
08/05/2011 14:05:14

These legal developments have become coupled with rapid changes
in the investment management of trusts. Modern portfolio theory has
led to an evolving understanding of correlations (or lack of them)
among asset classes and the corresponding implications for diversification, the creation of whole new investment asset classes and products by
Wall Street, and the rediscovery by trustees of long-standing classes of
assets that prior to the Prudent Investor Act were seldom found in institutional trust portfolios, such as alternative investments and commercial
real estate.
Unsurprisingly, these developments have raised concerns among
settlors and trust practitioners as to whether any single trustee is or will
remain over the long life of the trust the most qualified fiduciary to
make certain investment decisions. Many settlors and their advisors, no
longer feeling that the same person or institution should handle both the
administrative functions of their trusts and complex investment functions, have looked for ways to bifurcate or even more broadly disperse
responsibilities among those they view as the most skilled at each task.
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4. Philosopher-King Shortage
Arguably the best trustee, especially in light of the level of knowledge and wisdom required by modern trust laws and the complex circumstances of modern day life, is a “philosopher king” (or queen).
Philosopher kings and queens by definition have all the knowledge, time
and wisdom necessary to implement and administer an important trust,
know and love the family from whom the settlor and beneficiaries are
drawn, and are sensitive to all beneficiaries’ needs.
Unfortunately, philosopher kings are not always viewed by the settlor and all of the beneficiaries as in fact fully-qualifying philosopher
kings. And whether viewed as so qualified or not, those willing despite
their wisdom to accept the risks of a modern trustee are scarce.
One of the reasons for the use of multiple trust participants, then, is
the acceptance of the fact that the qualities of the philosopher king or
queen are more readily found in several participants than in a single
individual or even institution. Such roles as removing and replacing a
trustee who fell too far short of the philosopher queen ideal or of approving, vetoing, making or advising on specific key decisions can be
given to a trust protector, trust advisor or committee which appears to
bring to the table needed skills or knowledge to complement the
trustee’s.
5. Families Taking Ownership of Own Wealth

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 56 Side B
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Settlors and wealthy families desire to modify traditional trust
structures to better fit their needs and goals, thereby increasing the use
of multiple trust participants in the varied ways referred to above. For
example, a corporate trustee may be well-qualified to offer unbiased discretionary decision-making, but a settlor often wants to assure that such
decision-making is informed by the family’s views, values and goals.
That settlor has several ways of providing for such inputs, including
naming as co-trustee a close associate or appointing a specialized distribution advisor who will direct the trustee on discretionary distribution
decisions. As alluded to earlier, a settlor may also appoint a protector
merely for the purpose of monitoring the trustee’s performance.
Another aspect of families’ taking ownership of their wealth is the
wish to find fiduciaries in tune with all the branches and generations of a
family. This wish may be fulfilled by supplementing the trustee (especially an institutional trustee) with other participants viewed as attuned
to particular beneficiaries. Such participants may assume, for example,
co-trustee, advisor, protector, consenter or distributor fiduciary roles.
These types of provisions, in the authors’ experience, are often coupled
with a provision dividing the trust as beneficiaries reach a certain age,
whereupon the beneficiary of each divided trust may become a co-trus-
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tee and/or may be given powers to appoint an investment advisor
(sometimes including themselves) to direct the trustee.
6. Limiting Trustees’ Fiduciary Risk
A settlor’s desire to retain a concentrated position, whether in a
family’s closely-held business, real estate or a public company’s securities, can also promote the use of multiple trust participants. After a
number of unfavorable court cases,4 many institutional and individual
trustees are uncomfortable holding (or, in some cases, liquidating) concentrated positions in trusts despite trust language clearly authorizing
and even strongly encouraging retention without regard to a common
law or statutory duty to diversify. Creative statutory efforts to bolster
the authority for holding a concentration have been made in several
states such as New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee and Georgia,5
but trustee sensitivity remains, especially since some of the cases appear
to have strained to ignore existing statutory language that appeared to
condone the concentration.6
One way to induce a trustee to accept a trust involving a concentration is to relieve her of investment responsibility for that asset. For example, a strategy now frequently employed by some trust counsel, and
often acceptable to institutional trustees, is to create a special investment advisor role just to make investment decisions regarding a particular asset, ideally in a jurisdiction that both recognizes this division of
responsibility and clearly limits the directed trustee’s liability.

The desire of settlors and families to control more trust functions is
also a product of the trend toward dynasty trusts. Needing the trust to
remain relevant and flexible over decades and much longer requires settlors and their advisors to consider ways to allow a trust to adapt to
changes in the law and family situations and desires. For this purpose

08/05/2011 14:05:14

4 See In re Will Dumont, 791 N.Y.S.2d 868 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2004), rev’d, In re Chase
Manhattan Bank, 809 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 2006); In re Kettle, 73 A.D.2d 786 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979) (in which a trustee was held to have breached its fiduciary duties by
selling a single stock holding for diversification purposes despite a will provision directing
the trustee to retain it. The court stated that the stock was a good investment at the time
it was sold, and there was no compelling reason for the sale); see also infra note 6.
5 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-901(b) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-58 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-341 (2010).
6 See In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997); In re HSBC Bank USA
N.A., 30 Misc.3d 1201(A) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010); Wood v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 828 N.E.2d
1072 (Ohio 2005); Fifth Third Bank v. Firstar Bank N.A., 2006 Ohio 4506 (Ohio Ct. App.
2006); Hartman v. Walker, 73 Va. Cir. 245 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007).

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 57 Side A

7. Use of Dynasty Trusts

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 57 Side B

08/05/2011 14:05:14

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\36-4\ACT403.txt

778

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 10

2-AUG-11

10:44

[Vol. 36:769

they may add protectors who can amend the trust, or trustee removers/
appointers who can remove and replace trustees.
The authors have also seen settlors and families use trust protectors
and advisors simply to retain within the family and their close advisors
as much power and control as possible without running afoul of federal
tax laws. As an example, a family member can retain investment discretion, and someone other than a family member, with the requisite independence, would be given distribution powers.
8. State Trust Law Optimization
Finally, state trust laws are undergoing almost constant change
these days as states vie to become jurisdictions of choice for trusts.
Many states, especially Delaware7 and the no-income-tax states of New
Hampshire,8 Nevada,9 South Dakota,10 Tennessee,11 Wyoming,12
Alaska,13 and Florida14 have been quick to adopt statutes that allow for
increased trust flexibility, the shifting of liability, and other provisions
deemed favorable by settlors in the hopes of attracting trust business
from outside the state.
The trend has not only affected smaller states that create these almost boutique trust law offerings. Large population states such as Illi-

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 57 Side B
08/05/2011 14:05:14

7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2011) (trust adviser limitation of
liability).
8 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-411 (2011) (modification and termination of trust by consent); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1205 (2010) (excluded fiduciary limitation of liability).
9 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §164.725 (2010) (notice of proposed action and limitation of liability).
10 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-2, 5 (2010) (excluded fiduciary limitation
of liability); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-24 (2010) (modification and termination of
trust).
11 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-411 (2010) (modification and termination of
trusts).
12 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-412 (2010) (modification and termination of
trusts); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-717 (2010) (limitation of liability of fiduciary).
13 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.100 (2010) (creation of “community property”
trust).
14 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.0412 (2010) (nonjudicial modification of irrevocable
trust); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902 (2010) (limitation of liability with respect to life insurance
investments).
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nois,15 Massachusetts,16 Michigan,17 New York,18 and California19 have
attempted to retain their own citizens’ trusts by adopting modern principal and income acts, dynasty trust authority and other attractive trust
laws.
As the attraction of these laws has grown, settlors and families increasingly shop for the best jurisdiction for their particular trusts. Settlors who are drawn to multiple participant trust structures may take
particular note of states that have strengthened their directed trust
laws20 or that have clarified the duties and liabilities among multiple
trust participants.21 Even if attracted to a state for reasons other than a
desire to use a multi-participant structure, an incentive to use such a
structure arises when a trust is sited with a trustee in a state with attractive laws but far removed from the settlors’ or the beneficiaries’ home
state. In many such instances, the settlor and the beneficiaries will wish
to keep as many trust powers as possible with home state co-trustees,
advisors or protectors, particularly if they can do so without triggering
multi-state fiduciary taxation.
9. Conclusion
The incentives to use multi-participant trusts are powerful and
wide-ranging and resonate with significant trends among wealthy families and in modern wealth management. The trend to using these trusts
is likely to continue and perhaps even accelerate for the same reasons.
As professionals in the trust, estate planning and fiduciary services
fields, we need to recognize the opportunities and potential pitfalls surrounding multi-participant trusts and adopt effective responses.

Many types of trustee and non-trustee participants in multi-participant trusts are identified here, along with their most typical functions.
Despite the attention the authors pay in this section to trust participant
nomenclature, only the familiar participant names of “trustee”, “co-trustee”, “directed trustee” and “power holder” have any fixed legal mean15

08/05/2011 14:05:14

See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/3 (a-5) (2010) (qualified perpetual trusts).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203D, § 1 (2010) (The Massachusetts Principal and
Income Act).
17 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7103(n) (2010) (trust protector).
18 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2010)
(decanting).
19 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15400-14 (West 2010) (modification and termination of trusts).
20 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2011).
21 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703 (2010) (duty to communicate);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-B:12-1204–1205 (2010) (liabilities).
16
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ing in most jurisdictions except for the meaning given them by a
particular trust instrument.
Even states that expressly recognize by statute the existence of trust
protectors, trust advisors and other non-trustee participants do not generally specify the trust powers that can be assigned to each. Accordingly, any participant with any of the non-trustee names below may be
given any one or a combination of trust powers, and usually the only
way to know the powers of a non-trustee participant is to refer to the
trust instrument.
1. Full Trustee/Co-Trustee
A full trustee has the sole authority under the governing instrument
to manage all aspects of trust administration, including making discretionary distributions and full investment management responsibility.
A co-trustee may be given by the trust instrument all the responsibilities of a full trustee or a narrower set of responsibilities. However,
the ability to limit co-trustee responsibilities (and liability) varies from
state to state.
2. Directed Trustee/Restricted Trustee

08/05/2011 14:05:14

22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 (1959) (stating “if under the terms of
the trust a person has the power to control the action of the trustee in certain respects,
the trustee is under a duty to act in accordance with such exercise of such power, unless
the attempted exercise of the power violates the terms of the trust or is a violation of a
fiduciary duty to which such person is subject in the exercise of the power.”); See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 (2003); see also infra Subsection III.B.2; see
supra Introduction.
23 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 (2005); see also infra Subsection III.B.2.
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A trustee is a “directed trustee” if required under the terms of a
trust document to follow the directions of a third party (an investment
advisor or any of the other types of trust participant discussed in this
article) in performing certain discretionary functions. The functions that
such a trustee is directed on usually involve investment decisions, discretionary distribution decisions or trustee succession.
A true directed trustee is required to follow such directions and is
generally justified in doing so or in not taking affirmative action when
not directed.22 In contrast, a trustee who must obtain the consent of a
third party in order to act (or refrain from acting) still has an affirmative
duty to initiate action.23 Except where the authors otherwise specify,
this article refers to the former type of trustee when discussing directed
trustees.
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3. Investment Advisor/Investment Committee
An investment advisor or investment committee has authority to
make investment management decisions with respect to all or specified
trust assets. Such investment decisions generally include whether to retain, purchase, sell, exchange, tender, or encumber trust assets. Investment advisors and investment committees also can include any party
accepting the delegation of a fiduciary’s power to direct the acquisition,
disposition or retention of any investment.
In most states an investment advisor or investment committee, like
all of the trust participants that follow in this Subsection B, meet state
law definitions of “power holders” and their actions are governed by
common law and statutory provisions governing power holders.
4. Trust Advisor

08/05/2011 14:05:14

a. To perform a specific duty or function that would normally
be required of a trustee or co-trustee.
b. To advise the trustee or co-trustee concerning any
beneficiary.
c. To consent to a trustee’s or co-trustee’s action or inaction
relating to investments of trust assets.
d. To direct the acquisition, disposition, or retention of any
trust investment.
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The term “trust advisor” is most commonly used to describe persons authorized to exercise investment powers under a trust who, as
noted above, are often more specifically referred to in trusts as an “investment advisor” or “investment committee.” The term, however, is
increasingly being used to describe persons with broad discretionary
powers outlined in the governing trust instrument. This role can include
those of an investment advisor, trust protector or a distribution advisor
whose role and authority may be more specific.
Trust advisors are typically distinguished from trust protectors by
their assumption of responsibilities traditionally held by a trustee. In
contrast, a trust protector will more typically exercise powers that a trustee would not normally exercise, such as removing and replacing a trustee, amending the trust, or modifying a beneficiary’s interest. However,
most states with statutes expressly recognizing trust advisors and trust
protectors do not limit the trust powers that can be given to either type
of non-trustee participant.
The New Hampshire Uniform Trust Code attempts to capture the
range of powers that are given by trust instruments to a trust advisor but
without limiting the powers that may be granted to a trust advisor to the
specified ones:
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e. To consent to a trustee’s or co-trustee’s action or inaction
in making distributions to beneficiaries if this power is not
given to a trust protector.24
5. Distribution Advisor/Distribution Committee
A distribution advisor/distribution committee has the discretionary
authority to direct trust distributions to beneficiaries.
6. Trust Protector
A trust protector is any disinterested person with the discretionary
powers outlined in the governing trust instrument and whose decisions
are typically binding on all parties. Again, the New Hampshire Uniform
Trust Code attempts to capture the full range of powers that may be
given to a trust protector25 while not limiting the powers that can be
granted to or withheld from one designated by a trust instrument as a
trust protector. Under the New Hampshire Uniform Trust Code, a trust
protector may be given any of the following powers:
a.

25

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1203 (2006).
§ 564-B:12-1201.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

24
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To modify or amend the trust instrument to achieve
favorable tax status or because of changes in the Internal
Revenue Code, state law, or the rulings and regulations
implementing such changes.
b. To amend or modify the trust instrument to take advantage of changes in the rule against perpetuities, laws governing restraints on alienation, or other state laws
restricting the terms of the trust, the distribution of trust
property, or the administration of the trust.
c. To appoint a successor trust protector.
d. To review and approve the accountings of a trustee.
e. To change the governing law or principal place of administration of the trust.
f. To remove and replace any trust advisor for the reasons
stated in the trust instrument.
g. To remove a trustee, co-trustee, or successor trustee, for
the reasons stated in the trust instrument, and appoint a
successor.
h. To consent to a trustee’s or co-trustee’s action or inaction
in making distributions to beneficiaries if this power is not
given exclusively to a trust advisor.
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To increase or decrease any interest of the beneficiaries in
the trust, to grant a power of appointment to one or more
trust beneficiaries, or to terminate or amend any power of
appointment granted in the trust; however, a modification,
amendment or grant of a power of appointment may not
grant a beneficial interest in a charitable trust with only
charitable beneficiaries to any non-charitable interest or
purpose and may not grant a beneficial interest in any trust
to the trust protector, the trust protector’s estate, or for the
benefit of the creditors of the trust protector.26

Even where statutes such as this one enumerate protectors’ powers,
settlors are left free to assign any power to a trust protector, including
those normally associated with the positions of “trust advisor” or “investment advisor.”
7. Trustee Remover/Trustee Appointer
A trustee remover is a person with the authority to remove the current trustee or other trust participant. A trustee appointer is a person
with the authority to appoint a successor trustee or other trust participant. A participant limited to such powers may often, nonetheless, be
referred to as a trust protector.
C. A “Coordination Gap” Among Multiple Trust Participants?

Id.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2005) (“A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of
its beneficiaries.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) cmt. b. (2003); In
re Hunter, 910 N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. Surr. 2010) (finding bank liable for its failure, among
other things, to consider the best interests of the beneficiaries regarding diversification).
27
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26
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Whether a trust has a single individual or corporate trustee or multiple participants, the goal of trust administration is to accomplish the
purposes of the trust and further the interests of its beneficiaries consistent with those purposes and the other terms of the trust instrument.27
When there is only a single trustee exercising all of the fiduciary
and administrative powers granted by the trust, the trustee does not
have the challenge of coordinating activities with other participants who
have independent authority and responsibility derived from the trust instrument or applicable law. He does not have to be concerned with
whether another participant has done a job upon which the trustee’s
own performance may depend on or be concerned with whether another
participant has done the job well. And there is no such thing as trust
governance when the only party that can act is a single trustee.
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1. Contrast with Delegation

See infra Subsection I.E.3.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

28
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It is useful to contrast the structure of a multi-participant trust mandated by the trust instrument with the situation in which a trustee has
delegated part of its responsibilities to a third party, such as a custodian
or an investment manager. The retained powers of the trustee make the
delegate relationship far more easily managed than the multi-participant
structure.
While there are additional parties for the trustee to be concerned
about in a delegation context, the trustee has chosen the delegate and
has entered into (or at least had the opportunity to enter into) an agreement with the delegate as to how the latter should perform his responsibilities. The trustee is free to insist on retaining in its agreement the
authority to supervise and direct the delegate, receive whatever information the trustee desires, change the scope of the delegation and remove the delegate. Moreover, state law tends to be fairly clear on what
responsibility the trustee has for the delegate’s actions.
In contrast, when the responsibility for trust decision-making and
administration is allocated by a trust instrument among a trustee and
others, the trustee has no authority to dictate the terms of its relationship with other trust participants, and retains only such duties, rights and
authority vis a vis the other participants as may be found in state law or
the trust instrument. Unless the law or the trust instrument so provides,
the trustee has no right even to be kept informed of other participants’
actions, let alone to direct them.28
By the same token, in a multi-participant trust, the ability of the
others to direct the trustee or obtain information from the trustee may
be limited to the specific authorities granted in the trust instrument, at
least where, as in most states, statutory and case law is silent on what
duties, if any at all, the participants owe each other. Finally, it often is
not clear to what extent the trustee and other participants may incur
liability for the acts or omissions of one another.
In Section E of this Part I, the authors discuss in detail some of the
negative consequences that can and have occurred with multiple participants acting for a trust. Some of those consequences have been encountered in practice or become public in litigation. An additional wide
range of issues is identified there that should be anticipated and prepared for in moving from the traditional approach of using a full trustee
to administer a trust to employing multiple individuals or entities to do
so.
An example would be converting to a total return trust, which may
require coordinating trustees, investment advisors and distribution advi-
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sors, all with independent powers, instead of a traditional, sole fiduciary
making all decisions and taking all necessary actions or with full power
to direct its delegates to do so. If the multiple participants don’t all
agree or act in a coordinated fashion, then the ability to take such an
action can be complicated or made impossible.
2. Undeveloped Law
Other than for co-trustees and, to a lesser extent, directed trustees,
case law dealing with the various trust participants is as yet undeveloped. Statutory law is incomplete in almost every jurisdiction, and
where it exists, it is often unclear in its application to the multi-participant context. However, the law is more developed in a small number of
leading jurisdictions. A major but partial step forward has been taken
by the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”),29 adopted in one form or another
in twenty-three states and the District of Columbia30 and which addresses some key issues, but leaves many others untouched.
As will be seen in Part III, where statutory law has not clarified the
duties and liabilities of trustee and non-trustee participants in multi-participant trusts and trust instruments are not clear and specific, courts
tend to default to applying to all participants the traditional duties and
liabilities of full trustees or co-trustees.
3. Burden on Trust Counsel

08/05/2011 14:05:14

29 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) drafted the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), and it was approved for enactment at
the Commissioners’ 2004 meeting.
30 The UTC has been enacted in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. UTC legislation has
also been recently introduced in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Uniform
Law Commission, Trust Code: Enactment Status Map, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?
title=Trust%20Code (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 61 Side A

Anyone drafting a trust with multiple trust participants must meet
the challenge of achieving transparency as to the responsibilities and potential liability of trust participants, ultimately to assure such trusts will
work as intended. These challenges can be met but only through an
arduous multi-step process.
As a first step, trust counsel must consider carefully the effect that
the laws that will govern the substance and administration of the trust
will have on the performance of all of the participants and even on their
willingness to act. Such consideration may lead to embracing the possi-
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bility of siting the trust in one of the jurisdictions with relatively clear
and better developed laws in this area.
For his second step, trust counsel must carefully draft trust provisions to fill any state law gaps in setting standards of conduct, duties to
coordinate and liability for participants’ own or others’ acts and omissions, and he must overturn any standards, duties and liabilities imposed
by the law that are inconsistent with the settlor’s objectives. Detailed
suggestions for accomplishing these goals are set forth in Part IV, Section B of this article.
Finally, trust counsel must confirm that the provisions of the trust
that are intended to override state law will be effective to do so under
the applicable state law.
D. Overcoming the “Coordination Gap”—Helping Multiple Trust
Participants Work Together

08/05/2011 14:05:14

1. Every trust power and duty granted expressly or by implication of law has to be assigned or left to a trustee or assigned to another participant.
2. Every trust participant must know his/her functions under
the trust and, wherever feasible, have accepted responsibility for those functions.
3. Every trust participant has to know enough about what is
going on in the performance of the trust by other partici-
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Before we enumerate problems that can arise from having multiple
trust participants or review the current state of the law, we would like to
suggest some things that in our view are necessary to effectively coordinate and govern multiple trust participants under a single governing instrument. From a trust implementation and administration standpoint,
these appear to us to be basic requirements for a well-functioning organization of trust participants.
To the extent these requirements are not supplied by mandatory or
default state law provisions—and as will soon be seen they largely are
not—they must be supplied by the trust instrument. Theoretically, they
could be met by the trustee and other participants voluntarily and spontaneously getting together and working out agreements as to all these
matters. The likelihood of their doing so—especially through binding
agreements as to such matters as their respective liability—strikes the
authors as slim.
The following six items comprise the list of basic requirements for
making an effective organization out of the multiple participants
brought together by a trust instrument. An expanded list of requirements built around these six items is set forth in Part II of this article,
with further details and discussion provided in Part IV.
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pants to do his or her own job timely and capably. Conversely, each participant has to share enough information
to make it possible for the other participants to perform
their tasks that are dependent on the actions or information of the first participant.31
4. Some way must be found for disputes among participants
to be resolved and their actions coordinated.32
5. There must be adequate incentives (compensation and reimbursement or a personal relationship with settlors or
beneficiaries) to attract trust participants with the capability and commitment to devote the necessary time and attention to perform well their roles.
6. Participants must be made comfortable that they will not
be exposed to unreasonable or unknown liabilities if they
accept their roles.
E. A Sampler of Problems That Have or Can Arise with MultiParticipant Trusts

1. Lack of Clarity Regarding Roles, Responsibilities and
Authority
One of the most common and challenging issues for multiple trust
participants can be a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
This is usually a result of trust drafting that either lacked specificity or
created overlapping responsibilities.
Consider, for example, a trust protector who may not fully appreciate the role that has been given to her under a trust requiring the trustee

08/05/2011 14:05:14

31 In other words, there must be communication among participants, recognition of
their interdependence and the means for addressing the issues interdependence raises.
32 Assuming that it is not deemed sufficient to leave all coordination and dispute
resolution up to a court, one or more of the trust participants—e.g., the trustee, a trust
protector or a committee of trust participants—may need to be given that role explicitly.
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While there are many advantages to a multiple trust participant
structure, such as highly specialized expert involvement, more settlor/
family involvement and control, better-managed liability and increased
flexibility, the introduction of multiple participants with performance
obligations into a trust complicates administration and will have unintended consequences if the requirements described in the preceding section have not been met. The following situations have actually arisen or
are easily foreseeable in light of ambiguities or gaps in the laws of most
states or imprecision in a governing instrument or that instrument’s failure to address the governance and administration issues created by a
multi-participant trust.
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33 Robert T. McLean Irrev. Trust v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)
(“McLean”). See discussion infra Sub-paragraph III.B.5.a.(ii).
34 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 794.
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to get the protector’s consent for various decisions. The settlor may
have intended the protector to take an active role in reviewing the facts
and circumstances regarding each decision, as well as any recommendations by the trustee, and expected her then to exercise her own discretion and judgment. But the trust may simply require consent and the
protector may view her role as more of a stamp of approval on the decision-making of the trustee. Conversely, the trust protector may have
understood her role correctly and appropriately asked if the trust will
reimburse her should she need to retain an expert to review the circumstances and advise her.
Another example of lack of clarity might involve a directed trustee
and an investment advisor. The settlor wants responsibility for diversification to reside with the investment advisor and assigns all investment
responsibility accordingly, but the instrument is silent as to whether the
directed trustee retains a duty to diversify. The investment advisor proposes to purchase stock in a company that will result in a concentration
and, under the common law, the directed trustee is required to exercise
fiduciary responsibility and believes he or she cannot execute a direction
that would result in a breach of fiduciary duty of either the investment
advisor or the directed trustee. The directed trustee is unsure whether
or not to follow the direction of the investment advisor in this situation.
McLean v. Davis33 is the first reported trust protector case that has
come to the authors’ attention. The trust agreement authorized the
trust protector to remove and replace the trustee. The trust protector
was sued for acting in bad faith by failing to stop the predecessor cotrustees from inappropriately (a) spending trust funds (settlement proceeds from a personal injury lawsuit where the protector had been the
lawyer trying the case and the trustees were the original referring lawyers) and (b) acting against the interests of the beneficiary.
While much of the opinion involved what fiduciary duties the trust
protector owed to whom, a central issue was the role the grantor intended the trust protector to have. The court said that the trust instrument “does not specify how or when the trust protector is to carry out
his ‘authority’ to remove trustees and appoint their successors only that
this authority is conferred in a fiduciary capacity.”34 The case highlights
the importance of crafting trust participants’ roles thoughtfully and
clearly.
If a trust participant chooses to accept an appointment but is aware
of ambiguities or overlaps in the various trust roles, the trust participant
or the trustee may have no alternative but to seek instructions from the
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court, or reach clarification through some other means such as obtaining
consent from the current beneficiaries, perhaps relying on nonjudicial
settlement agreements of contingent beneficiaries and minors. These
are expensive and uncertain courses of conduct.
2. Uncertainty as to Duties, Standards and Liability

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty

to Administer the Trust
of Loyalty
with Respect to Delegation
to Keep and Render Accounts
to Furnish Information

08/05/2011 14:05:14

35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959); See also In re Estate of West,
948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997).
36 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169–185.

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 63 Side A

We discuss in Part III of this article the statutory and common law
governing the authority of various trust participants in various roles and
whether each is a fiduciary as a matter of law. Other than for full trustees, the law remains unspecific and sparse regarding whether trust participants such as investment advisors, distribution advisors or
committees, directed trustees and protectors, are fiduciaries and if so
the applicable duties of a fiduciary.
For example, will a trustee remover be under an affirmative duty to
monitor the actions of the trustee to ensure that the trust is being administered properly? Or can he just wait until he is informed of a problem by a beneficiary? Does a discretionary distribution advisor have a
fiduciary’s duty of impartiality with regard to multiple beneficiaries?
Can a trust protector purchase assets from the trust, or would such an
action be considered a breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty?
Because guidance for most trust participants other than trustees is
often only provided in broad generalities under current law, it is helpful
to start by looking at the standards and duties of a traditional full trustee. The standard of care for a trustee is generally stated as the care a
person of ordinary prudence would take in dealing with his or her own
property.35 A trustee has such a fiduciary responsibility to the settlor
and the beneficiaries of the trust.
Depending on the purpose of the trust, particular duties can vary
but there is generally a core set of duties. When multiple trust participants are involved, some of these duties and standards may be divided
among the parties. Other duties and standards may by implication apply to all multiple trust participants if the instrument and state law do
not state otherwise.
The default duties of a trustee generally include the following:36
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
Duty
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to Exercise Reasonable Care and Skill
to Take and Keep Control
to Preserve the Trust Property
to Enforce Claims
to Defend Actions
to Keep Trust Property Separate
with Respect to Bank Deposits
to Make the Trust Property Productive
to Pay Income to Beneficiary
to Deal Impartially with Beneficiaries
with Respect to Co-Trustees
with Respect to Persons Holding Power of Control

McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 794.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 806 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(f) (1994).
38

OF

TRUSTS § 174; see

08/05/2011 14:05:14

37
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The authors discuss in this article the current state of the law regarding specification of the standards and duties of various trust participants. Specificity, however, as to trust participants’ duties, is rare.
Consequently, trust participants should assume their duties will be
drawn from the foregoing list, but they cannot be certain which ones
apply unless the trust instrument states whether the participant is a fiduciary and which fiduciary duties she has.
The McLean case, mentioned earlier, highlighted the question of
the scope of responsibility given the protector to monitor the trustee to
determine a need to appoint a successor. But it also raised the issue of
the duty of care owed by the protector where state laws were silent and
the trust instrument was at best ambiguous. McLean examined the duties of a trust protector authorized to remove and replace trustees to
determine if the trust protector should have affirmatively exercised his
powers when the trustees were misusing the trust funds. The Missouri
Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the protector
and remanded the case for further proceedings, reasoning that the
trust’s use of “fiduciary capacity” in reference to the protector implied
“at least the basic duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality. . .[and] the
existence of at least some duty of care.”37
The Uniform Trust Code states that “a trustee who has special skills
or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee’s representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise shall use those special skills.”38 Consequently, settlors who select trust participants with
specialized skills can be putting them at heightened risk. The Restatement of Trusts also reflects that professional trustees are held to a
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higher standard.39 Courts of numerous jurisdictions have shown a propensity for holding specially skilled fiduciaries to a high standard.40
3. Inadequate Communication and Coordination Among Trust
Participants
All trust participants should be better able to fulfill their own responsibilities with adequate information about the trust’s administration
and investment management and the actions of the other trust participants. While many trust decisions even in a multi-participant trust are
made by a single participant, the execution of most decisions can require
coordination among two or more participants.
For example, in a trust with a directed trustee and an investment
advisor, the decision to convert to a total return trust may be within the
province of the directed trustee, but its implementation may require the
investment advisor to re-orient the asset allocation of the investment
portfolio. Unfortunately, except in the case of co-trustees, duties to
communicate or coordinate are seldom found either in the law or in
governing instruments.
The authors have not exhaustively researched every state’s common law, but they have found no leading trust state’s law or a treatise
identifying a common law duty of trust participants to communicate information to each other. The only such duties of which the authors are
aware first arose in 2007 amendments to the New Hampshire UTC and
in a 2010 addition to Delaware trust law.41
4. Disharmony Among Participants

08/05/2011 14:05:14

39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (2003); Compare PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. d. (1992) with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2003).
40 See New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 59 N.E.2d 263 (Mass. 1945). The court
states that the law does not look with special favor upon attempts to impair the breadth
and strength of the safeguards that experience has erected for the protection of those
whose property has been confided to the good faith and sound judgment of the trustees,
and this general attitude should not be softened first for the benefit of trust companies
and professional trustees who hold themselves out as fully conversant with the duties of
trustees and fully competent to perform them. See also Stevens v. Nat’l City Bank, 544
N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1989); In re Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In
re Estate of Estes, 654 P.2d 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). See, e.g., Charles E. Rounds, Fiduciary Liability of Trustees and Personal Representatives, 853 TAX MGMT. A-3 (2003); see
also Lauren J. Wolven & Jeffrey A. Zaluda, Fiduciary Risk Management, 47 TAX MGMT.
MEMO. 195 (May 15, 2006).
41 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313
(2011). See infra Subsection III.C.2.
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Consider a directed trustee who will be responsible for paying estate taxes from a decedent’s revocable trust. Shortly after the dece-
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5. Compensation and Reimbursement Uncertainty
Most trusts and governing laws provide for the compensation and
reimbursement for expenses of a trustee from the trust,42 but governing
law generally does not provide for the compensation or reimbursement
of the various other trust participants. Many trust documents are also
silent on the issue of compensation and reimbursement of multiple trust
participants.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

42 See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7 (West 2011) (provides the trustee with
reimbursement for all proper expenses incurred in the management and protection of the
trust and reasonable compensation for services rendered).
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dent’s death, the directed trustee recommends that the investment
advisor sell assets, including several volatile, concentrated positions in
publicly-traded stocks, in order to be prepared to pay the taxes. The
investment advisor named by the settlor refuses to sell out of the concentrated positions, thereby exposing the trust assets to market risk and
the potential of not being able to satisfy known liabilities such as estate
taxes.
The trust and governing law do not address how the trustee and the
investment advisor are to resolve this disagreement. The directed trustee is concerned about its potential liability if the assets take a downturn
in value during administration as well as uncertainty regarding having
sufficient assets to pay taxes.
While this may seem like a dramatic example, it is one that one of
the authors has experienced firsthand. In that situation, the directed
trustee was eventually able to convince the investment advisor to sell
the concentrated positions but only after significant time passed (during
which the trust assets were exposed to market risk) and after considering options such as court action to compel the sale. While the trust instrument in other respects was carefully crafted, it was not contemplated
that there would be a lack of cooperation among the various trust
participants.
What liability would the directed trustee have had if the assets had
diminished in value during the period of administration and were inadequate to pay taxes or even to meet the settlor’s beneficial intentions?
The trust clearly held the directed trustee not liable for following the
directions of the investment advisor but the directed trustee did have
responsibility for paying estate taxes and, therefore, the potential for
liability could still exist. Such lack of consensus can also occur over
more day-to-day trust administration or distribution decisions.
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6. Unfilled Vacancies
While elaborate provisions in governing trust documents often exist
for filling vacancies in trusteeship throughout the term of the trust, there
are often less robust (or no) provisions for succession of trust participants like investment advisors, trust protectors and distribution advisors. Such provisions as exist may only reference the current participant
and his or her first successor. Similarly, most states have statutes
describing how successor trustees can be selected to fill vacancies in
trusteeship, but they do not cover the various other trust participants.43
The absence of succession provisions not only can leave a void in the
office of the trust participant, but it may leave the other trust participants in the position of not being able to carry out their own
responsibilities.
7. Exposure to Multi–Jurisdiction Taxation
Under a murky system of state laws, fiduciary income taxation is
determined based on factors unique to each state. Taxation can be
based on the location of one or more of the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

The trustee’s (or other participant’s) domicile/residence;
The beneficiary’s(ies’) residence;
Trust administration;
Trust assets;
Source of trust income; and
Settlor’s domicile/residence when the trust became
irrevocable.44

08/05/2011 14:05:14

43 See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13 (West 2011) (provides that the majority
in interest of the beneficiaries then entitled to receive the income from the trust estate
may appoint a successor trustee when there is no remaining trustee).
44 Anita Sarafa Williams, Where to Place Your Trust: A Comparison of Different
State Situs Options, 2004.3 NOTRE DAME TAX & EST. PLAN. INST. § 26 (2004).
45 See King & Tunney v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 2007 Cal. Tax LEXIS 406
(Cal. Oct. 4, 2007) (asserting that a trustee or any other person may be a California
fiduciary for tax purposes if they act in any fiduciary capacity for a trust); N.Y. STATE
DEP’T TAX’N & FIN., JPMorgan Chase Bank, Adv. Op., TSB-A-04(7)I (Nov.12, 2004)
available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/advisory_opinions/income/a04_7i.pdf (last accessed
Apr. 27, 2011) (asserting that trust advisors may be “trustees” for tax purposes).
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The trend toward multiple trust participants has the potential to
open more trusts to the risk of taxation in multiple jurisdictions on the
basis of where a fiduciary resides and/or where trust administration
takes place. Taxing authorities in California and New York have been
particularly aggressive about whether a trust advisor domiciled in their
jurisdiction is a “fiduciary” that will subject the trust to taxation in their
state.45
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8. Implied Duty to Look for Misdeeds of Other Trust
Participants or to Warn Beneficiaries
The law varies from non-existent to in flux regarding the duty of the
various trust participants to review the deeds of other trust participants
and to warn the beneficiaries of a breach or potential breach of trust.
Guidance comes only from a few state statutes and some recent ERISA
litigation. These are discussed in more detail in Part III of this article.
It is instructive to look at how co-trustees are treated under the
UTC and to analogize their duties to other trust participants. Under the
UTC, all co-trustees must exercise reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a serious breach of trust and to compel a co-trustee
to redress a serious breach of trust.46
The UTC’s standards apply to full trustees who share responsibility
over the entire trust administration, but it is a challenge to determine
which of these standards would apply to trust participants who have limited or discrete roles in trust administration and whether additional
standards should be considered in light of their need to work with each
other. For instance, do they or should they have a duty to prevent a
breach of trust by other trust participants or to warn of such a breach, as
the McLean case suggests?47 As will be seen, the law is still emerging,
and trust counsel will need to decide for themselves the duties to apply
where the law is occult or inconsistent with what counsel deems desirable for effective trust administration.
9. Decision-Making and Implementation Complexity

II. TWELVE REQUIREMENTS FOR A WELL-FUNCTIONING
MULTI-PARTICIPANT TRUST

46
47

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(g)(1)-(2) (2005).
See McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 793-94.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

When a trust has only one fiduciary—a traditional trustee with all
the duties, powers and responsibilities for implementing the trust’s
terms and trust administration and for pursuing its purposes and the
best interests of its beneficiaries—there can be no problems of coordination and no uncertainties as to responsibilities. Such a trustee never
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Trusts with multiple participants often require more than one participant to make, consent to or not veto a decision. Trust instruments
generally identify the role of each participant in decision-making but not
the process by which decisions must be made. This means that guidance
is unavailable to participants as to who must initiate the process, what
must be communicated to others with a role in the decision and the
timetable for each to act or decline to act.
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lacks for information as to what has been done in the name of the trust
or with the trust’s assets, even if the trustee has delegated some of its
functions, including discretionary functions, to another person (provided
the trustee retained the right to supervise and remove its delegates and
required them to communicate promptly and regularly their actions and
the status of assets entrusted to them).
When there are multiple fiduciary participants, the need for cooperation and coordination and to know who has what responsibilities will
exist and must be supplied by law, the trust instrument or spontaneous
action of the participants. While the multi-participant trust instrument
by definition is one that identifies a trustee and one or more other trust
participants and allocates certain responsibilities for trust activities
among them, in the authors’ experience, trust instruments can be vague
even as to the allocation of the responsibilities identified and seldom
provide insight as to how the participants are intended to relate to each
other, their duties and applicable standards.
These things will not be known to participants or the beneficiaries,
therefore, unless (i) the common law or statutes of the applicable jurisdiction or jurisdictions specify them or (ii) the participants agree how to
govern themselves. Absent such laws or unlikely (and perhaps unforseeable) agreements, such trusts may only function as intended if trust
counsel determines and specifies in the trust instrument (a) the exact
responsibilities and duties of each trust participant, (b) the standards
that should apply to them, (c) their liability for losses to the trust or
beneficiaries arising from their failures to fulfill the assigned duties, and
(d) how the participants should work together.
Absent such provisions in law or governing instruments, serious adverse consequences can result for trusts and their beneficiaries as well as
trustees and non-trustee participants. High profile disasters have been
few thus far (perhaps because of the relative newness of multi-participant trusts), but the possibility of such disasters in the future may make
many institutions or individuals either unwilling to act under such trusts
or inclined to demand substantial risk premiums for doing so.
The state law review in Part III will show that no state’s laws supply
all of the necessary provisions to meet the requirements for a well-functioning multi-participant trust. Fortunately, the law at least provides in
many states that governing instruments trump both statutory and common law provisions affecting the actions and interrelationships of multiple fiduciaries. For those states the requirements for a well-functioning
multi-participant trust can be fulfilled by skilled and prescient draftsmanship. In some states, however, neither statute nor case law has
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clearly addressed whether trust instrument provisions may overcome a
contrary or clarify a vague statutory or common law provision.48
Part IV of this article discusses in some detail twelve specific requirements for a multi-participant trust that the authors believe must be
met if the purposes of the trust are to be fulfilled without unreasonable
expense and risk. The twelve requirements fall into two groups: (A)
legal determinations necessary to provide clarity as to the legal and risk
parameters of the multi-participant trust and (B) trust governance items
necessary to assure adequate coordination among trust participants. To
aid the practitioner’s consideration of the upcoming review of state law
and of the utility or necessity of the twelve requirements for a wellfunctioning multi-participant trust, they are introduced here without extensive commentary.
A. Requirements for Clarity as to Legal and Risk Parameters of a
Multi-Participant Trust
These five items must be ascertained and made clear to trust participants and settlors for them to understand the legal environment and
risk parameters applicable to the participants’ roles:49

08/05/2011 14:05:14

48 I AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 4 (4th ed. 2001) & VA id. § 575 and cases cited therein [hereinafter Scott].
49 As noted above, each is discussed in greater detail infra in Part III of this article
(Subsections C.1-C.4).
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1. Where the trust will be administered and therefore the law
of administration (which must be ascertained despite trust
participants located and acting in multiple states).
2. Whether each non-trustee participant is a fiduciary or not
and whether a fiduciary or not, certainty as to:
a. the standard, if any, for the performance of its responsibilities and whether losses due to a failure to meet
that standard attract liability; and
b. what if any duties of trustees adhere to its assigned
responsibilities.
3. The potential liability, if any, of the trustee or a non-trustee participant for the known or unknown acts or omissions of another participant.
4. Whether a trustee or non-trustee participant must follow a
direction provided by another participant within the scope
of the directing participant’s responsibilities but which the
receiver knows, reasonably believes or should have known
would violate the instrument, law or the direction giver’s
or the receiver’s fiduciary responsibility.
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5. More generally, whether a directed trustee is relieved of
any responsibility with respect to a function assigned to a
non-trustee participant other than to follow that participant’s directions.
Each of these five determinations could be supplied by law but
rarely are, and even if supplied by law, the law’s solution may well not
further the purposes of the particular trust or the needs of the trust’s
beneficiaries.
B. Requirements for an Effective Multi-Participant Trust
Management Structure
Seven more elements of an effective multi-participant trust structure, relating to how trust participants perform their responsibilities and
relate to each other, follow:50

These seven items are explained further infra in Part IV.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

50
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1. Communication among the fiduciary participants as to,
among other things, what they have done, what they have
been told by beneficiaries or others, the assets in the trust
from time to time and, in particular, the distributions requested, approved or made or of an election to convert to
a unitrust or exercise a power to adjust.
2. Coordination among the trust participants, such as speaking with a consistent voice to beneficiaries, investing and
liquidating assets according to the liquidity needs of the
trust for expenditures and distributions, taking a consistent
view as to the legal obligations of the trust to beneficiaries
and others or the tax obligations of the trust.
3. Filling vacancies in trust participant positions and determining who if anyone must perform a vacant participant’s
functions pending appointment of a successor.
4. Time limits for a trust participant to exercise an approval
or veto right or obligation, and whether after the expiration of such time, the action will be deemed approved or
vetoed.
5. When more than one participant has the power to act or
decide on a matter, certainty as to whether action must be
taken unanimously, by majority vote or by any one of the
empowered participants, and whether a dissenting participant need do more than voice an objection to the other
participants to protect himself/herself from liability.
6. Expeditious, competent and final out-of-court resolution
of any disagreement among trust participants.
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7. Certainty as to the amount of compensation and reimbursement of expenses, if any, the non-trustee participants
are entitled to receive.

III. EFFECT

OF STATE LAW ON THE FUNCTIONING
MULTI-PARTICIPANT TRUSTS

OF

A. Overview

51
52

See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

The legal review that follows reveals that current law fails to provide trust counsel adequate guidance as to the duties or liability of trustee and non-trustee participants in multi-participant trusts or the
standards that will apply to measure fulfillment of the duties once determined. Many states have yet even to adopt a directed trust statute.
Moreover, even in most states that have adopted directed trustee statutes, a lack of clear statutory language adds to the confusion.
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Even the most progressive states do not provide the common law or
statutory provisions to clarify the foregoing legal and risk parameters of
the multi-participant trust without resort to explicit trust provisions.
Very few states provide any trust governance guidance, let alone sufficiently robust guidance to eliminate the need for trust instrument expansion or clarification. The UTC in the form recommended by the
Uniform Laws Commissioners51 not only fails to successfully address
these twelve items, its recommended provisions may block effectively
addressing some of them in the trust instrument.52 Moreover, even an
ideal state statutory regime will not and probably should not address
each of the twelve items since not all settlors will want the same answers
for every trust. Perhaps the ideal state for a capable and conscientious
trust counsel, therefore, is one that allows the settlor great freedom in
the trust instrument to customize the various roles, duties and liabilities
notwithstanding any statutorily-set defaults.
What is clear is that no matter the law that will be applicable to the
interpretation and administration of the trust, careful trust counsel need
to consider whether any of the foregoing twelve requirements apply,
and to the extent they do, they must decide how they will address them
in the trust instrument.
The authors acknowledge, however, how arduous this task can be,
especially if the practitioner is to seek out the best state trust law environment for his client. But much of the burden is inherent in these
trusts, stemming as much from their power and complexity as from the
inadequacy of the current state of both common law and statutory law.
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Illustrating the confusion, the Delaware Chancellor in the unpublished 2010 decision of Paradee v. Paradee53 reached what appears to be
the right decision about who had responsibility for certain misconduct
involving a trust, but he applied the Delaware directed trustee statute—
that governs and protects the relationship between a trust advisor empowered by the trust instrument to direct the trustee—to an advisor
chosen by the trustee who lacked any power to direct the trustee.
Even the three most fundamental questions about directed trusts
have not been clearly answered by the law of most states with directed
trustee statutes:
1. Are the non-trustee participants fiduciaries?
2. If so, what fiduciary duties of a full trustee do they have to
the beneficiaries?
3. What liabilities do trustees—full, co- and directed—have
regarding the actions and omissions of non-trustee participants? Conversely, what liabilities do non-trustee participants have regarding the actions and omissions of the
trustees?
If the practitioner is not satisfied with the answers provided by state
law to any of these questions (or the absence of answers), then assuming
she does not want to abandon the multi-participant trust structure, her
only option will be to set forth in the trust instrument the specific answers for these questions in order to effectuate the settlors’ wishes and
reasonably assure sound trust management. This raises another fundamental state law question that also must be convincingly answered:

Most states’ common law is sketchy at best on this issue, but many,
including all UTC states, provide by statute that trust provisions do
override most contrary state law, subject, however, to explicit and important (sometimes unfortunate) exceptions.54 In states adopting the
standard UTC language, the statute does not allow the trust instrument
to override the duty of a trustee to act in good faith, the power of the
court to modify compensation of a trustee, limits on exculpatory provisions, and the rights of a person other than a trustee or beneficiary.55
Common Law of Who Is a Fiduciary and Fiduciaries’ Duties. As
might be expected, the richness of the case law considering the respec-

54
55

No. 4988-V.C., 2010 WL 3959604 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2010).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3303 (2011).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) (2), (7), (10) & (11).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

53
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4. Does applicable state law support trust provisions that are in
derogation of the common law or contrary to statutory
prescriptions?
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See supra Section III.B.
Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Fiduciary Liability of Trustees and Personal Representatives, 853 TAX MGMT. PORT. A-1 (BNA 2003), citing Austin Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949).
58 Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). See also
Curl v. Key, 316 S.E.2d 272, 275 (N.C. 1984); Link v. Link, 179 S.E.2d 697 (N.C. 1971).
59 Rounds, supra note 57, at A-1.
60 CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK § 7.1 (2010).
61 Crocker-Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Younger, 481 P.2d 222, 228 (Ca. 1971) (finding
that a trust advisor is a fiduciary with the same rights and duties as a trustee).
62 II Scott, supra note 48, § 185.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 (1959).
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 (2003).
65 II Scott, supra note 48, § 185.
66 Rebekah Ryan Clark, Writing on the Wall: The Potential Liability of Mediators as
Fiduciaries, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1033, 1034.
57
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tive powers, duties and liabilities of participants in multi-participant
trusts varies significantly with the length of time that a particular type of
participant has been widely used. Accordingly, the common law of cotrustees is well-developed, that of directed trustees less so but developing and cases considering trust advisors and trust protectors and their
variants until recently were non-existent.56
The fact that there is a deficiency of cases overall and a void in most
states does not mean it cannot be anticipated what the courts are likely
to conclude when they do focus on non-trustee participants’ status and
duties. There is a large body of case law addressing who is a fiduciary in
a variety of contexts and laying out the principles for making that
determination.
The general rule of this case law is that a fiduciary is a person who
undertakes to act in the interest of another person.57 A fiduciary relationship is further defined as one in which “there has been a special
confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound
to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.”58 It is said that often a fiduciary relationship will involve property and brings with it a duty of undivided loyalty.59
Moreover, a trustee is personally liable to the beneficiaries for injury
occasioned by negligent or intentional breaches of trust.60
Based on these principles, courts,61 Scott,62 and the Second63 and
Third64 Restatements of Trusts have apparently had little difficulty in
concluding that a person empowered to control a trustee is a fiduciary if
the power is conferred on him for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the
trust.65
Despite the extensive body of case law, there is hand-wringing in
the literature about the “unpredictability of the traditional approach to
determining fiduciary liability.”66 In the case law, certain types of for-
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Id. at 1035-37.
In McLean v. Davis, the court labored somewhat to conclude that the protector in
question was a fiduciary, relying in part on a reference to a “fiduciary capacity” in the
trust instrument in addition to the nature of the relationship between the protector and
the beneficiaries. 283 S.W.3d 786 at 794-795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). With protectors such
as in this case, the situation is muddied where the trust protector does not exercise a
power of the trustee but a power to remove the trustee. However, the earmarks of a
fiduciary—formal relationship in which a person undertakes to act in the intent of another—clearly appear.
68
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mal relationships in which trust and confidence have been reposed other
than trust relationships, such as agent/principal, attorney/client, partnership, corporate management and guardianship relationships, have given
courts little difficulty in finding a fiduciary.67 All of the various trust
participants the authors are concerned with in this article meet the criterion of being part of a formal relationship, established as they are by the
trust instrument, and involve the repose of trust and confidence by the
settlor in the participant on behalf of trust beneficiaries. One might say
the question is less whether these participants are fiduciaries than
whether they will have the same fiduciary duties as a trustee by law or
the terms of the trust instrument.
This conclusion—that a fiduciary relationship exists—seems compelled by analogizing the non-trustee participant’s role to the role of the
full trustee. If the test of the nature of the relationship were a quantitative one—How much of a trustee’s discretion is exercised by the nontrustee?—then perhaps a more difficult question would be presented.
But presumably a fiduciary relationship defined as above is distinguished by its qualities and not by quantities, and a trust participant with
full or shared discretion over any area in which a trustee would otherwise exercise discretion seems qualitatively to be the same kind of relationship as the trustee’s.
Thus the authors conclude without further ceremony that absent
language to the contrary in the trust instrument, courts will generally
decide that non-trustee participants charged with exercising a part of a
trustee’s discretionary powers are fiduciaries.68 This means of course
that they will have fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries. But not every
fiduciary relationship attracts every fiduciary duty of a trustee or trustee’s standard for performance of a duty or a trustee’s liability for
breaches of that duty.
Lists abound of factors considered by courts in determining the
range of fiduciary duties applicable to non-traditional fiduciaries. These
do include quantitative measures, such as the levels of expertise, dominance, control and discretion, compensation and the magnitude of the
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69 Clark, supra note 66, at Part III (summarizing the framework of Brett G. Scharffs
& John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. c. (1959).
71 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b)-(d) (2005).
72 See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2770 (2006).
73 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:8-813(k) (2006).
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wrongdoing or the harm,69 but their application is too fact specific to
guide trust counsel when drafting a trust. Even the Restatement (Second) seems wary of stating rules for discerning the fiduciary duties of
power holders in all their protean modes, “The extent of the rights, duties and liabilities of the holder of the power depends upon all circumstances; and no exact rules on the matter can be stated.”70
Once again the common law leads the multi-participant trust counsel to the necessity of prescribing in the trust as much as possible of the
respective rights, duties and liabilities of all the participants. The authors provide in Subsection B below a brief review of the common law
of fiduciary duties of co-trustees and non-trustee participants to aid trust
counsel in determining the duties that may need to be included or excluded for each participant. They also consider discussions and rulings
on the duties of trustees and other trust participants to one another
bearing on the issue of whether trust participants have a legal mandate
to coordinate with each other in addition to coordination just being a
sensible thing for them to do.
State Statutes. The inclusion in the UTC of provisions sanctioning
power holders in terms encompassing the roles of trust advisor, trust
protector and others who may direct trustees,71 together with similar or
more extensive statutes adopted in many other states, has done surprisingly little to simplify the task of trust counsel. These new statutes tend
to make clear that the use of such power holders is permitted, that trustees must generally respect their directions, and that a trustee’s liability
for a power holder’s actions or omissions has been to one degree or
another limited. But they rarely are explicit about the fiduciary duties
of the power holders or what residual duties trustees have with respect
to power holders (e.g., duty to monitor or warn) notwithstanding sanctioning the shift to the power holders of various trust functions.72
In addition, only beginning in 2007 with New Hampshire73 did any
state impose an explicit duty on trustees and power holders even to
communicate with each other in the interest of the more efficient execution of a trust.
Conclusion. Despite statutory efforts and recent cases beginning to
address multi-participant trust issues, trust counsel must still determine
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or specify the exact duties of each trust participant, the standards that
should apply to the participant, her liability for losses to the trust or
beneficiaries arising from her failures to fulfill the assigned duties, and
how the participants should work together to fulfill the trust’s purposes.
B. The Common Law of Trustees and Non-Trustees in MultiParticipant Trusts
1. Co-Trustees
Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making
Co-trustees hold the same roles, duties and responsibilities as a single trustee and are subject to the same standards of care. If there are
several trustees, each is under a duty to participate in trust administration and to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing
a breach of trust.74 If a breach occurs, the co-trustee may need to compel his or her co-trustee to redress a breach of trust.75
i. Allocation of Responsibilities. If the terms of a trust with more than
one trustee provide that one or more of the trustees shall have exclusive
authority with respect to an area of trust administration, the other trustee ordinarily has no duty to participate in the exercise of control or
authority in matters encompassed by the provision.76 If, however, a nonparticipating trustee has reason to believe that the responsible trustee
may be committing or about to commit a breach of trust, the non-participating trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps to investigate and, if
necessary, to prevent a breach of trust.77

74
76
77
78
79

See generally, UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. c. (1959).
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 (2003).
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ii. Decision-Making. According to case law and leading treatises, the
common law historically required unanimous decision-making among
co-trustees (unless, of course, the trust document provided for majority
rule or otherwise). For example, the Restatement (Second) states that
where there are several trustees, action by all of them is necessary for
the exercise of powers conferred upon them.78 However, the Restatement (Third) reverses this position and provides that trust powers may
be exercised by a majority of trustees.79
In a case of irreconcilable differences of opinion among trustees,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Stuart v. Continental Illinois National
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Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago80 stated that the deadlock must be resolved by the courts. Some trusts provide that a majority of trustees or a
particular specified trustee is entitled to decide questions or take action
when disagreements occur. Even when such a provision exists, however,
it remains the duty of all trustees to participate in decision-making with
respect to those matters and to be an informed fiduciary participant in
deliberations.81 Co-trustees have also been found to have a duty to consult.82 Moreover, each trustee has the duty to use reasonable care to
prevent a breach of trust by the trustee who possesses decisive
authority.83
If one or more of several trustees acts without the consent of the
others, the others can properly ratify his or her action if such ratification
is in the best interests of the trust.84 In addition, if the terms of the trust
provide for it, trustees are permitted to delegate the exercise of powers
to one another.85
Compensation and Reimbursement
Co-trustees are entitled to compensation out of the trust estate. In
the absence of a trust or statutory provision or an agreement with the
beneficiary, a trustee is entitled to receive fair value for his or her services, subject to court approval.86 When there are two or more co-trustees, the compensation of each is ordinarily the same as would be
received by a single trustee (unless there is a trust provision, a statutory
provision or an agreement with the beneficiary that provides
otherwise).87

In general, the liability of co-trustees/fiduciaries is joint and several.88 Restatement (Second) states that a co-trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary for a breach of trust committed by a co-trustee unless such
co-trustee
i.
80

participates in the breach by his or her co-trustee; or

08/05/2011 14:05:14

369 N.E.2d 1262 (Ill. 1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 184 cmt. c.
82 See Kline v. Reed, 479 N.E.2d 714 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (suggesting a co-trustee
has a duty to consult with her co-trustee.)
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 184 cmt. c. (1959).
84 Id.
85 Id. at cmt. d.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. b.
87 Id. at cmt. l.
88 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, & AMY MORRIS HESS,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 701 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2010).
81
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improperly delegates the administration of the trust to
his or her co-trustee; or
approves or acquiesces in or conceals a breach of trust
committed by his co-trustees; or
by his or her failure to exercise reasonable care in the
administration of the trust has enabled his or her co-trustee to commit a breach of trust; or
neglects to take proper steps to compel his or her cotrustee to redress a breach of trust.89

Many jurisdictions do not allow a trustee to avoid liability by being
inactive in the administration of a trust. As stated earlier, trustees also
have a duty to try to prevent a breach of trust by a co-trustee. In a
famous case involving the estate of artist Mark Rothko,90 two of the
three executors were surcharged $9 million for lost appreciation damages resulting from their divided loyalty sale of Rothko’s paintings (one
executor was employed by the gallery that received the paintings for
sale or consignment and one executor sold his own paintings through
the same gallery).91 The third executor was surcharged $6 million for
failing to attempt to prevent his co-executors from their self-interested
transaction.92
When a co-trustee dissents, he or she is often able to avoid liability.
Comments to the Restatement (Third) state that the majority rule provisions of most states ordinarily protect a dissenting trustee from liability
for an act authorized by the majority, while preserving the co-trustee’s
normal duty to participate in deliberations and decision-making and to
act reasonably to prevent a breach of trust.93

a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making
The power of a grantor to direct a trustee has predated for some
time the current popularity of directed trustees. Delaware, for example,
has had some version of a directed trustee statute for years.94 The Restatement (Second) has long stated that “if under the terms of the trust a
person has power to control the action of the trustee in certain respects,
the trustee is ordinarily under a duty to act in accordance with the exercise of such power, unless the attempted exercise of the power violates
89
91
92
93
94

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224 (1959).
In re Rothko’s Estate, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 294.
See id. at 294-95.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 cmt. a. (2003).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §3313 (2011).
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the terms of the trust or is a violation of a fiduciary duty to which the
directing person is subject in the exercise of such power.”95
Restatement (Third) also recognizes the grantor’s right to give
power to a third person to direct the actions of the trustee.96 Until recently, however, the courts dealt only sporadically with the role and validity of directed trustees.97 Some treatises and recent ERISA cases
have started to clarify a directed trustee’s role and potential liability.98
i. Directed Trustee’s Duty to Follow Directions of Power Holder. Unless otherwise provided by the trust or governing law, “if the power to
direct the trustee is for the sole benefit of the person holding the power,
the only duty of the trustee is to ascertain whether the attempted exercise of the power is or is not within the terms of the trust and act accordingly.”99 However, if the power to direct the trustee is held by a third
party in a fiduciary capacity (e.g., an investment advisor directing investments or other trust advisor), the directed trustee’s duty is similar to a
co-trustee’s.100
In such case, the directed trustee is under a duty to act in accordance with the exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise of
the power violates the terms of the trust or is a violation of a fiduciary
duty of the power holder.101 If a violation of fiduciary duty by the
power holder is suspected, the trustee is under a duty not to comply and
may be liable if he or she does comply.102 According to Restatement
(Second), if a power holder insists on compliance, the trustee subject to
95

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 71 Side B
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 (1959).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 (2003) provides as follows:
Except in cases covered by § 74 (involving the powers of revocation and other
ownership-equivalent powers), if the terms of a trust reserve to the settlor or
confer upon another a power to direct or otherwise control certain conduct of
the trustee, the trustee has a duty to act in accordance with the requirements of
the trust provision reserving or conferring the power and comply with any exercise of that power, unless the attempted exercise is contrary to the terms of the
trust or power or the trustee knows or has reason to believe that the attempted
exercise violates a fiduciary duty that the power holder owes to the
beneficiaries.
97 Walgren v. Dolan, 276 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1990) (relying on Illinois precedent in holding a trustee bound to the sale of assets by a settlor with power to direct).
98 See, e.g., 2 DAVID L. BACON, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS GUIDE § 22.01 (2004) (discussing fiduciary duties of a directed trustee in ERISA context); see also Ershick v.
United Mo. Bank, 948 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1991); Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F.Supp.
1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. d.
100 Id. at cmt. e.
101 Id. at cmt. d.
102 Id.
96
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the direction may need to apply to the court for instruction.103 Similarly, Bogert provides that with regard to a special trustee (one who has
a specified function under the trust such as with regard to retaining or
selling a closely held asset), the general trustee must follow the directions of the special trustee in exercising power as long as the power does
not otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.104
A true directed trustee then is required by the trust instrument to
follow the directions of a third party in performing certain functions.
The directed trustee in this case usually has only the responsibility of
carrying out the directions when made. In contrast, if a trustee has to
obtain consent of another party in order to act or refrain from acting,
such trustee has an affirmative duty to act and is not a true directed
trustee. Such a trustee is not justified in doing nothing until consent is
given but must obtain consent if he or she believes action should be
taken.105
Importantly, the Restatement (Second) also treats the power
holder who exercises his or her power for the benefit of others (e.g., an
investment advisor or distribution advisor) as a fiduciary subject to the
same duties and liabilities as a trustee.106 Thus, both the power holder
and the directed trustee are treated as fiduciaries.107

iii. Directed Trustee’s Duty to Warn and Keep Informed. A directed
trustee can be protected from liability under a trust or statute but will
still be held to general fiduciary duties. An important case on point is
Rollins v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Virginia,109 in which the
trust contained an asset concentration in a publicly traded stock in local
textile companies. The trust provided that the settlor’s children had full
103
104
106
107
108
109
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105

Id.
BOGERT, supra note 88, § 122.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. g. (1959).
Id. at cmt. d.
See Belcher, supra note 2, at ¶ 1303.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. e.
Rollins v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Va., 56 Va. Cir. 147 (2001).
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ii. Directed Trustee’s Duty to Supervise Actions of Trust Advisor. Governing law and the trust agreement itself may determine a directed trustee’s duty to supervise the actions of a trust advisor. If, however, a
directed trustee is in a state without the UTC or other statutory provision addressing the issue, there is very little case law on the issue. The
Restatement (Second) states that if the trustee suspects that the exercise
of power by the power holder is in violation of the power holder’s fiduciary duty, the trustee has a duty not to comply and to seek court instruction if needed.108
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authority over “investment decisions as to the retention, sale, or
purchase of any asset of the Trust Fund.”110 The trustee obtained written authority of the beneficiaries to over-concentrate the trust and sold
the stock twenty years later at the children’s direction. The children
sued for $25 million in damages, claiming, among other things, failure to
diversify and failing to actively secure approval for the sale of the declining stock. Virginia has a statute explicitly relieving a directed trustee
of liability as a fiduciary for following a direction.111 The court found
the directed trustee not liable for breach of trust for failure to diversify.112 However, the court stated that
[t]o ensure the trust’s conservation, a trustee also has a duty to
keep informed as to the condition of the trust. Additionally,
the trustee has a duty to impart to the beneficiaries any knowledge he may have affecting the beneficiary’s interest and he
cannot rid himself of this “duty to warn.”113
The court went on to state that “the trustee has a duty to fully inform the beneficiaries of all facts relevant to the subject matter of the
trust which come into the trustee’s knowledge and which are material
for the beneficiary to know for the protection of his interests.”114
The Rollins court examined the Virginia statute and determined
that the statute clearly prohibited the law from imposing liability on the
trustee for failing to do what he had no ability to do but held that

110

08/05/2011 14:05:14

Id. at 149.
Id. at 149 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 26-5.2(c) (2010), which provides as follows:
Whenever the instrument under which a fiduciary or fiduciaries are acting
reserves unto the trustor, testator, or creator or vests in an advisory or investment committee or any other person or persons, including a cofiduciary, to the
exclusion of one or more of the fiduciaries, authority to direct the making or
retention of investments, or any investment, the excluded fiduciary or cofiduciary shall be liable, if at all, only as a ministerial agent and shall not be liable as
fiduciary or cofiduciary for any loss resulting from the making or retention of
any investment pursuant to such authorized direction.)
112 Id. at 150.
113 Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 149-50.
115 Id. at 150 (citation omitted).
111
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[T]he prohibition on recovery does not excuse a trustee from
liability for failing to participate in the administration of the
trust or for failing to attempt to prevent a breach of trust.
Thus, a trustee may be held liable for a loss caused by his conduct for actions he was entrusted to take. The demurrer is
overruled as to. . .the allegations of breach of fiduciary duty,
except as they relate to failure to diversify.115
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A directed trustee, therefore, must remember his fiduciary duty to
keep the beneficiaries informed based on the knowledge that the trustee
has even if such trustee does not have authority otherwise to act on this
knowledge.
iv. Directed Trustee Free of Duty to Supervise Trust Advisor. On a
more positive note for directed trustees, in Duemler v. Wilmington Trust
Co.,116 the individual co-trustee and sole investment advisor of a trust
established for his family sued the corporate trustee alleging that the
corporate trustee breached its fiduciary duty to the trust for failing to
provide him with appropriate financial information necessary for him to
make an informed investment decision on a bond that defaulted and lost
significant value.
In an unpublished bench ruling cited by one commentator, Vice
Chancellor Strine ruled in favor of the corporate trustee, finding that
the Delaware directed trustee statute117 required the investment advisor
to make investment decisions without oversight from the trustee.118
Vice Chancellor Strine stated that it was an apt instance for the application of the Delaware statute because there was “absolutely no evidence
of willful misconduct” on the part of the corporate trustee and to rule
otherwise would undermine the statute.119 The court did find the investment advisor had breached his fiduciary duties.120

08/05/2011 14:05:14

116 Duemler v. Wilmington Trust Co., No. 20033 (Del. Ch. Oct. . 28, 2004) (unpublished opinion available in Gordon, supra note 2, § 18-8). See Duemler v. Wilmington
Trust Co., No. 20033, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 206 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) for a summary of
the case’s holdings.
117 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b) (2011).
118 Duemler, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 206 at *2-3.
119 Gordon, supra note 2, § 18-9.
120 Duemler, No. 20033, at 13.
121 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex 2003).
122 Id. at 562.
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v. Directed Trustees Under ERISA and the Duty To Warn and Investigate. There are also some high profile ERISA cases that address directed trustee duties to supervise, investigate and warn. In Tittle v.
Enron Corp.,121 the court expanded the Second Restatement’s “reason
to suspect” standard, holding an ERISA directed trustee to a “knew or
should have known” standard.122 Northern Trust was the directed trustee of three Enron ERISA plans. A day after Enron announced its $1.2
billion charge against third quarter earnings, Northern Trust imposed a
blackout period on the purchase or sale of Enron stock in its 401(k) plan
pursuant to previous directions from the plan sponsor to allow for a
change in trustees from Northern Trust to a successor trustee.
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b. Compensation
While neither case law nor treatises address the issue of compensation of directed trustees, in the real world, it has been common for institutional trustees to charge a different fee for directed trustee roles than
for acting with full investment management and administrative responsi123

08/05/2011 14:05:14

Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
125 See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 403(a)(2),
29 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
126 Tittle, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
130 Id. at 765-67.
131 Id. at 761.
124
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The Plaintiffs sued the directed trustee (among many other parties)
for breach of fiduciary duty related to the blackout and for failing to
diversify. They claimed that the earnings charge made the blackout imprudent, the directed trustee should have postponed the blackout and
the directed trustee knew or should have known the investment in Enron stock was imprudent.123 Northern Trust claimed it was a directed
trustee not a discretionary trustee.124 ERISA has a directed trustee concept in its statute.125 The court, relying heavily on Sections 184 and 185
of Restatement (Second), held that the directed trustee’s fiduciary duties are preserved even though the directed trustee’s authority was restricted by the directing fiduciary and breach of those fiduciary duties
could result in liability.126 The court concluded that it was a factual
question whether the evidence was sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary
duty by the directed trustee to investigate the advisability of purchasing
company stock.127 The court found that the directed trustee still retained a degree of discretion, authority and responsibility that may expose the trustee to liability.128
In In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation,129 a similar analysis of
directed trustee duties was employed by the court. The court found the
directed trustee had an obligation to inquire as to the prudence of continuing to invest in company stock in a 401(k) plan, but only if the directed trustee had material non-public information or there were
reliable public information raising serious questions about the company.130 The court concluded that the directed trustee was not required
to exercise its independent judgment in deciding how and whether to
invest employee funds as directed, but that it had to make sure that
WorldCom’s directions (as Investment Fiduciary) were (a) proper, (b) in
accordance with the terms of the plan and (c) not contrary to ERISA.131
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bilities. While fees will obviously vary significantly, the fee will generally be less in order to take into account the responsibility and liability
retained by the directed trustee. However, the willingness of institutions to act as directed trustee at any price is increasingly likely to depend on how clear their responsibilities and liabilities will be.
c. Liability
The concept of a directed trustee raises the expectation of limited
liability under common law for following the direction of a third party,
but the trustee may be liable for following directions, nonetheless, “[i]f
the trustee has reason to suspect that the holder of a power is attempting to exercise it in violation of a fiduciary duty to which the holder is
subject in the exercise of the power.”132 Although the unpublished
Duemler case found in favor of the directed trustee under the Delaware
statute, the Rollins, Tittle and WorldCom cases illustrate the perils faced
by directed trustees even when there is some statutory protection.
Where the trustee has no reason to suspect there was a violation of
fiduciary duty by the holder of a power to direct, a question may still
linger, absent a clear state statute, as to whether a trustee can completely divest itself of trust investment responsibility and liability even
though completely relieved of them by the settlor.133

Thus, directed trustees must tread carefully to be sure that they are
faithfully upholding all of their fiduciary standards and duties even
when directed as to a certain aspect of the administration.
3. Trust Advisors/Investment Advisors/Investment Committees
a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making
The case law on trust advisors generally is sparse though investment
advisors are most frequently given the same duty as a full trustee with
regard to the functions the advisor directs (e.g., investing and managing

133
134

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 185 cmt. e. (1959).
BOGERT, supra note 88, § 701.
CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK § 4.2 (2010).
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There is some authority to the effect that, in the case of an
irrevocable trust, a nontrustee to whom investment discretion
has been allocated will be held to a fiduciary standard in the
exercise of that discretion. It should be emphasized, however,
that this will in no way diminish the general fiduciary duties of
the trustee.134
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assets).135 Unless the trust limits the authority and scope of the investment advisor’s authority and duties, the investment advisor will have the
duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the trust assets as a prudent investor would in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the trust.
The standard for a trustee, requiring “the exercise of reasonable
care, skill and caution, [. . .] is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of a trust portfolio and as a part of an overall
investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives
reasonably suitable to the trust.”136 Unless otherwise provided, the advisor would also have a trustee’s duty to diversify trust assets.137 Certain other core fiduciary duties of a trustee are likely to apply such as
the duty of impartiality and loyalty, the duty to “act with prudence in
deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in the selection and
supervision of agents, and incur only costs that are reasonable and appropriate to the investment responsibilities of the trusteeship.”138
b. Compensation and Reimbursement

08/05/2011 14:05:14

135 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (2003). See also supra Subsection
I.B.4 (describing New Hampshire’s attempt to capture the powers most typically granted
to trust advisors).
136 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 729 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y. Sur. 2001).
140 Bryant, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
141 Id. at 314.
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The compensation for investment advisors can vary significantly depending on whether they are family members, who often take no fee, to
a full investment management fee if the investment advisor is also directly managing the investments. In In re Bryant,139 the New York Surrogate’s Court addressed the issue of what is reasonable compensation
for an investment advisor for a charitable trust under a delegation by
the trustee. The court determined that where the statute was silent regarding such compensation, the general rule was that it was within the
discretion of the Surrogate’s Court to determine what was reasonable.140 The court found the fees excessive and limited the advisor’s
fees.141 The common law is sparse on this issue but compensation for
investment advisors should be in proportion to the authority exercised
and the exposure to risk and should also be reasonable and consistent
with the duty of loyalty owed to the beneficiaries.
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c. Liability
Case law is undeveloped in this area, but if investment advisors or
investment committee members are in fact fiduciaries akin to trustees,
they may have exposure to significant risk, especially if the trust portfolio contains risky or concentrated assets. “The designated person’s fiduciary duties and liabilities with respect to the power are generally
comparable to those of a trustee.”142
Because an investment advisor typically exercises discretionary decision-making authority for others through the investment function, they
would fall under the Restatements’ (Second) and (Third) position that
they are fiduciaries and therefore subject to fiduciary duties. Unless the
risk is limited in the trust instrument or under governing law, the potential liability of an investment advisor or investment committee should be
the same as that of a trustee with regard to the investment responsibility
for the trust assets. Like a trustee, this would leave investment advisors
open to claims of breach of fiduciary duty for mismanagement of trust
assets and failure to diversify. Moreover, the investment advisor or investment committee may also have exposure to breach of more general
fiduciary duties such as the duty of loyalty, the duty of impartiality, and
the duty to inform.
4. Discretionary Distribution Advisors/Discretionary Distribution
Committees
a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making

143

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f. (2003).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §185 cmt. e. (1959); See Wernz, supra note 2.
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There is little if any case law addressing the duties and responsibilities of distributions advisors. The analysis of their responsibilities
should be quite similar to that of a trust protector (see infra Subsection
III.B.5). However, because a discretionary distribution advisor more
squarely fits the description under Restatement (Second) of a third
party power holder authorized to direct the trustee in a fiduciary capacity (for example, directing discretionary distributions among beneficiaries), the discretionary distribution advisor is likely in most cases to
be deemed to hold the power in a fiduciary capacity.143 With the common law unclear, the discretionary distribution advisor would be wise to
assume he or she owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries with regard
to the authority granted to him or her. Basic fiduciary duties would also
apply such as the duty of care and duty of loyalty.
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b. Compensation and Reimbursement
As with protectors and some of the other trust advisors, there is
little, if any, case law on the issue of compensation. In the authors’ experience, discretionary distribution advisors have often acted without
compensation. Where such compensation applies, however, it should be
in proportion to the authority exercised and the exposure to risk, and
should also be reasonable pursuant to the duty of loyalty owed to the
beneficiaries.
c. Liability
Case law has not addressed the issue of liability for discretionary
distribution advisors. However, there appears to be no reason to expect
it would be different from that of other power holders to the extent of
the authority granted.144 It is also unclear the extent that the receipt of
compensation (or lack thereof) impacts the issue of liability.
5. Trust Protectors
a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making

§ 185 cmt. e.
Sterk, supra note 72, at 2764.
146 See supra Subsection I.B.6 (describing New Hampshire’s attempt to capture the
powers most typically granted to trust protectors).
145
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i. General. Trust protectors were originally developed in the context
of offshore asset protection trusts to give comfort to far away settlors
concerned with relinquishing all control to a distant trustee. The trust
protector role was brought onshore to help attract domestic asset protection business.145 The use of protectors for other types of trusts became more widespread with the growing popularity of perpetual trusts
fostering settlors’ desires to establish oversight for the trustees and a
means to modify otherwise immutable trusts to deal with changes in the
law and beneficiary circumstances.
The duties of a protector are not generally delineated or limited by
case law or, except in a few instances, by statute.146 Trust instruments
grant a broad range of powers and authority to trust protectors. Perhaps the primary connotation of the term “trust protector” that differentiates it from other power holders is that a trust protector’s power is
seldom held for the benefit of the power holder, strengthening the likelihood that a trust protector’s role is fiduciary.
A trustee’s duties (and liabilities) when co-existing with a protector
will depend on whether the protector is given a veto power over trustee
decision-making, must consent to all trustee decisions, has any requirement to initiate certain actions, or has a trustee oversight role or a much
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ii. McLean. The Missouri appellate court looked at the potential duties of a trust protector in Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis,151 the only published case these authors have found dealing with
the status of trust protectors. In McLean, a successor trustee brought
suit against several predecessor trustees and the trust protector claiming
that the trust protector had breached his fiduciary duty to the beneficiary and acted in bad faith by failing to stop the trustees from inappropriately spending trust funds and acting against the interests of the
beneficiary. The trust instrument gave the trust protector the power to
remove trustees and to appoint successor trustees, and stated that the

148
149
150
151

Sterk, supra note 72, at 2770.
Id. at 2786.
Id. at 2787.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §185 cmt. d. & h. (1959).
283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
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more limited role. According to one commentator “even in states that
have labeled protectors as fiduciaries, the scope of the fiduciary duties
owed by the protector remains substantially uncertain.”147
The settlor may give a trust protector the power to consent to the
trustee’s decisions. A protector with such a power closely resembles
that of a co-trustee since a protector’s inaction when called upon to consent could paralyze the trust.148 The standard of care in such a case may
also closely resemble that of a co-trustee. Alternatively, the settlor may
give the protector the power to take action or not take action with regard to certain trust matters (such as removing the trustee or changing
situs). The fiduciary standards for a protector with this more limited
duty presumably should be less than for a protector who must consent
to all decisions.149
It is unclear how closely, if at all, a trust protector must monitor a
trustee’s actions to be prepared to override the decisions of a trustee.
Although the Restatement (Second) also treats the power holder who
exercises his or her power for the benefit of others (e.g., a trust protector) as a fiduciary subject to the same duties and liabilities as a trustee,150 current law is ambiguous as to which fiduciary duties would
actually apply.
Statutes dealing with trust protectors have been adopted in many
jurisdictions (and will be discussed in Subsection C), but there is little
case law directly referring to them. However, the nature of their role is
such that, as previously mentioned, it is almost always encompassed
within that of a power holder. Case law rules determining whether
power holders are fiduciaries, and their fiduciary duties and liabilities
when they are, should govern protectors who are power holders.
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iii. Unpublished Cases. One commentator reported two unpublished
cases in Delaware that his firm was involved in that also expressly dealt
with trust protectors.160
152
153
154
155
156
158
159
160
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Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 795.
Id.
Gordon, supra note 2, § 18.
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trust protector’s power is conferred in a “fiduciary capacity.”152 The
trust protector argued that neither Missouri law nor the trust instrument
imposed a duty on the trust protector to monitor the trustees.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the trust protector,
but the appellate court reversed and remanded, saying that because no
Missouri case has dealt with the function or duties of a trust protector
and no legal duties for a trust protector have been imposed by the Missouri legislature, “any such duties may only arise from the nature of the
relationship between the parties or the language of the trust.”153 The
court said that the trust instrument “does not specify how or when the
trust protector is to carry out his ‘authority’ to remove trustees and appoint their successors, only that this authority is conferred in a ‘fiduciary
capacity.’”154
Relying on the common law definition of a “fiduciary” in Black’s
Law Dictionary, the court said that a fiduciary owes the duties of good
faith, trust, confidence and candor.155 The court also noted that the
trust instrument provided that the trust protector would “not be liable
for any action taken in good faith,” and said that this exculpatory language implied “the existence of at least some duty of care”156 and “allows an inference that the trust protector could be susceptible to liability
for actions taken in bad faith.”157
Because the trust instrument grants the trust protector the power to
remove trustees in a “fiduciary capacity,” the court said this could infer
a possible expectation by the grantor that the trust protector would exercise his trustee removal power if the trustee was acting against the
purposes of the trust.158
The court concluded that “what duties and responsibilities the grantor intended the trust protector to have are not clearly set forth in the
language of the trust, and that intent is a significant and contested issue
of material fact” sufficient to reverse and remand the case.159
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b. Compensation and Reimbursement
It is the authors’ experience that compensation for a non-professional trust protector is still rare (especially when authority is limited
and/or the powers are lodged with beneficiaries of the trust or the settlor’s spouse), but for a protector who is actively monitoring the trustee,
consenting to decisions or taking affirmative action, compensation
should be considered. As with the other categories of trust advisors,
there is no common law on the issue. It is unclear whether compensation at the same level as a trustee is appropriate even for a trust protec-

08/05/2011 14:05:14

161 Friedman v. U.S. Trust Co. of Del., No. 20205 NC (2003 Del. Ch.), cited in
Gordon at 15.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 15-16.
164 Id. at 16-17.
165 Sterk, supra note 72, at 2785.
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In Friedman v. U.S. Trust Co. of Delaware,161 the court examined a
prior proceeding in the Delaware Chancery Court where a trust was
moved to Delaware, an institutional trust company was named as trustee, and the trust was modified to name a son as protector of a trust for
the benefit of his father (who was about to marry for the fifth time).
The language in the reformed trust provided that the trustee could not
exercise any rights, powers or privileges under the trust or take any action except upon the written consent of the trust protector. The father
and son had a subsequent falling out. The court struggled with the concept of a purely administrative trustee with a trust protector and ended
up vacating the order that had appointed both the son and trust company.162 No liability was assessed against the corporate fiduciary and
the parties agreed to litigate in California where the trust had previously
been administered.163
The other unpublished case was sealed but involved an offshore
trust being moved to Delaware. The trust protector had the power to
direct trust distributions and refused to do so because of hostility with
the trust beneficiary. At the urging of the court, the parties entered a
stipulated settlement to pay a monthly allowance to the beneficiary, to
have the protector resign and to move the trust back offshore.164
Another commentator believes that it would be an error to transplant wholesale the fiduciary standards of trustees to trust protectors
and that the standards should differ depending on the powers the settlor
has conferred upon the protector.165 Regardless of this view, trust protectors can take little comfort in the current state of the law. Without a
clearer statement of the standards of behavior in the law or in the trust
instrument, they may want to hold themselves to the highest standard.
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tor who is performing full oversight. Again, reasonable compensation
should recognize the risks and responsibilities of the trust protector as
well as take into consideration the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries.
c. Liability
As stated above, there appears to be only one published case (McLean) addressing the liability of a trust protector apart from those dealing with the broader category of power holder. Although a court is
likely to find some basis for holding trust protectors liable for a breach
of trust (e.g., inappropriately withholding consent for core trust functions), one commentator suggests that the issue of liability for a trust
protector is especially tricky since it does not fall squarely into trust or
contract law.166 The protector likely did not enter into a contract accepting his or her position and also does not hold legal title to the trust
property like a trustee.
Nevertheless, McLean has taken the perils to protectors out of the
realm of the theoretical and into that of legal precedent. Trust counsel
should consider carefully whether the protector should be immune from
liability and removal for misconduct, especially when the trust protector
holds broad powers. Such consideration is not a one-way street: trust
counsel must also consider the need to protect the beneficiaries from
incompetent or inattentive protectors as well. Whether state law imposes fiduciary duties on protectors or relieves them of it, trust counsel
has to decide what is in the best interests of her client and change the
state law defaults wherever appropriate.

The structure of many trusts depends on a protector fulfilling her
role. Case law does not address, however, what happens in the event of
a vacancy that has not been provided for by the trust instrument. Scott
suggests, “It would seem . . . that where the exercise of the power is not
merely authorized but is directed, or where its exercise is necessary to
carry out the purpose of the settlor, it can be exercised by the trustee [in
the absence of the power holder].”167 If this result is not desired by
trust counsel, he should provide otherwise in the trust instrument, but
the best solution is to thoughtfully address how to assure that vacancies
are promptly and appropriately filled.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

166 See Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl?, 4 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN.
137, 254-55 (1995).
167 II Scott, supra note 48, § 185 (emphasis added).
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6. Trustee Removers and Appointers
Trustee removers and appointers are really just a subset of a power
holder such as a trust protector and would therefore be subject to the
same principles as noted above for trust protectors although the duties
and liabilities presumably should reflect limits on the authority granted
to removers and appointers.
C. State Statutes, Uniform Acts and Multi-Participant Trusts
Recently, certain state statutes and the UTC have begun to clarify
the roles and liabilities of modern multiple trust participants. In some
states, the common law was codified.168 Other states adopted UTC
§ 808.169 In still other instances, states recognized the novelty of the
increased use of multiple trust participants and attempted to legislate
equally novel solutions defining their roles and providing greater clarity
and clearer protections to trustees and power holders as well as
beneficiaries.170
In the balance of this Section A, the authors review how states have
statutorily addressed key issues affecting the implementation and administration of multi-participant trusts with respect to the main types of
trustee and non-trustee participants. Subsections 1 and 2 below review
how certain states competing vigorously to attract trust business have
generally addressed by statute whether trust advisors, trust protectors
and other power holders are fiduciaries and what their fiduciary duties
are.

a. UTC
We look first at the standard UTC approach. Section 808, Powers
to Direct, makes explicit that anyone with a power to direct the trustee
for someone else’s benefit is a fiduciary, has fiduciary duties and will be
liable for failing to fulfill those duties. It provides as follows:
(a) ****
(b) If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the
settlor of a revocable trust power to direct certain actions of
the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise
of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a

169
170

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (2005).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15620 (West 2011).
See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the
beneficiaries of the trust.
(c) The terms of a trust may confer upon a trustee or other
person a power to direct the modification or termination of the
trust.
(d) A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to
direct is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to
act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the
interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power to direct is
liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty.171
Most states that have adopted the UTC have conformed to this
language.172
b. Non-Conforming UTC States

c. Non-UTC States
Other competitive non-UTC states have also addressed the same
issues statutorily. Unlike Wyoming or New Hampshire, none of the following three competitive non-UTC states as clearly limit the fiduciary
duties of such power holders to the assigned tasks.
171

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (emphasis added).
See supra note 30 for a list of adopting states, but see infra notes 173-75 and
accompanying text for certain states that have varied from the standard approach.
173 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a) (2011).
174 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (2010) (treating a trust protector as a fiduciary);
WYO. STAT. ANN § 4-10-713 (2010) (treating a trust advisor as a fiduciary).
175 ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.370(a), (d) (2010).

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 78 Side B

Some states have adopted non-conforming versions of the UTC to
better resolve the issue of whether non-trustee participants are fiduciaries and, in some cases, what their duties are. These include some of the
more competitive trust states:
New Hampshire. A recently enacted statute in New Hampshire
provides that a trust protector or advisor is a fiduciary, but clarifies that
only the duties corresponding to the powers granted apply: “A trust advisor or trust protector, other than a beneficiary, is a fiduciary with respect to each power granted to such trust advisor or trust protector.”173
Wyoming. Wyoming also statutorily treats trust protectors and
trust advisors as fiduciaries to the extent of the powers, duties and discretions granted to them under the terms of the trust instrument.174
Alaska. Alaska has taken the opposite tack: its trust protectors,
who must be “disinterested third parties,” are “not liable or accountable
as a trustee or fiduciary because of an act or omission.”175

172
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Delaware. Delaware law provides that
Where one or more persons are given authority by the terms of
a governing instrument to direct, consent to or disapprove a
fiduciary’s actual or proposed investment decisions, distribution decisions or other decision of the fiduciary, such persons
shall be considered to be advisors and fiduciaries when exercising such authority unless the governing instrument otherwise
provides.176
South Dakota. South Dakota’s comparable statute provides
If one or more trust advisors are given authority by the terms
of a governing instrument to direct, consent to, or disapprove a
fiduciary’s investment decisions, or proposed investment decisions, such trust advisors shall be considered to be fiduciaries
when exercising such authority unless the governing instrument provides otherwise.177
Moreover, South Dakota’s directed trustee chapter (of which the
foregoing is a part), specifically defines a “fiduciary” as
[A] trustee or custodian under any instrument, an executor, administrator, or personal representative of a decedent’s estate,
or any other party, including a trust advisor, a trust protector, or
a trust committee, who is acting in a fiduciary capacity for any
person, trust, or estate.178
Idaho. Idaho’s statute is comparable to those of Delaware and
South Dakota:

2. Co-Trustees
a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making
The states vary widely in their requirements regarding how cotrustees must engage in decision-making. Some have codified common

177
178
179

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2011).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-4 (2010).
§ 55-1B-1 (emphasis added).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501 (2011).
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If one (1) or more trust advisors are given authority by the
terms of a governing instrument to direct, consent to, or disapprove a fiduciary’s investment decisions, or proposed investment decisions, such trust advisors shall be considered to be
fiduciaries when exercising such authority unless the governing
instrument provides otherwise.179
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CAL. PROB. CODE § 15620 (West 2010).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3323 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 736.0703 (2011);
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 68-109 (2011); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10 (2010); IOWA CODE
§ 633A.4103 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7703 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3859
(2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703 (2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 10-10.7 (McKinney 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-03 (2009); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 113.085 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. § 701.19(9) (2011).
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 (2003) (Restatement (Third) rejects the
common law rule requiring unanimity followed in earlier Restatements.)
183 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 (2005).
184 Id. at cmt.
185 Id.
186 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(c).
187 § 703(d).
188 § 703(e).
181
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law unanimity.180 However, many states have adopted statutes providing that when the trust is silent, powers of the trustees may be exercised
by a majority (if two trustees, unanimity is still required).181 The Uniform Trust Code also follows the majority rule, in accord with Restatement (Third).182 Co-trustees who are unable to reach a unanimous
decision may act by majority.183
Official Comments to UTC § 703 express the view that co-trusteeship should be discouraged without careful consideration. They state
that “division of responsibility among co-trustees is often confused, the
accountability of any individual trustee is uncertain, obtaining consent
of all trustees can be burdensome, and unless an odd number of trustees
is named deadlocks requiring court resolution can occur.”184 The Comments also recognize, however, that the trust instrument can reduce potential problems through clear division of responsibilities.185
UTC. The UTC creates additional standards of behavior for cotrustees and codified some important common law. A co-trustee must
be active in performing its trustee duties, unless the co-trustee is unavailable to perform the function due to “absence, illness, disqualification under the law or other temporary incapacity or the co-trustee has
delegated the performance of the function to another trustee.”186 Thus,
passive co-trustees refrain from acting at their peril.
Taking some uncertainty out of the common law, the UTC provides
that if a co-trustee is unavailable for one of the reasons just stated, and
prompt action is necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust or to
avoid injury to the trust property, the remaining co-trustee or a majority
of the remaining co-trustees may act for the trust.187 However, a trustee
may not delegate to another co-trustee the performance of a function
that the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly.188
Under the UTC, all co-trustees also must exercise reasonable care to
prevent a co-trustee from committing a “serious” breach of trust and to
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compel a co-trustee to redress a serious breach of trust.189 Unfortunately, what constitutes a “serious” breach of trust is undefined under
the UTC, leaving the co-trustee to either make his or her own determination or to seek instruction in court.
Non-UTC and Non-Conforming UTC States. Many non-UTC state
statutes have similar provisions to the UTC. In Delaware, for example,
unless the trust expressly provides otherwise, a co-trustee is not excused
from liability for failure to participate in the administration of the trust
or for failure to attempt to prevent a breach of trust, or for failure to
seek guidance from the court in a recurring situation.190 But Delaware
more explicitly allows delegation to a co-trustee than does the UTC.
Under Delaware Code § 3323(a), “[A] majority of fiduciaries named in
a governing instrument may designate 1 of such fiduciaries to perform
ministerial functions on behalf of all such fiduciaries.”191
Contrary to the UTC, and despite a general common law duty not
to delegate, Illinois expressly allows a trustee to delegate to a co-trustee
any or all of the trustee’s rights, powers and duties.192
Duty to Communicate/Inform. New Hampshire in 2007 adopted a
unique statutory provision confirming a trustee’s duty to keep co-trustees and any other fiduciaries informed about trust administration. The
statute provides,

The explicit duty of a trustee to provide important information
about the administration of the trust to co-trustees and even other trust
participants can help alleviate some of the confusion between co-fiduciaries that was addressed in the comments to the UTC. While “material
information” is not specifically defined in the statute, the co-trustee
knows it must be information that would be reasonably necessary for

190
191
192
193

§ 703(g).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3323(b) (2011).
§ 3323(a).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/4.10 (2010).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703(i) (2011).
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A trustee shall keep each co-trustee and any other fiduciary
designated by the terms of the trust reasonably informed about
the administration of the trust, to the extent the trustee has
knowledge that the other co-trustee or other fiduciary designated by the terms of the trust does not have of the trustee’s
actions, or regarding other material information (or the availability of such information) related to the administration of the
trust that would be reasonably necessary for the co-trustee or
other fiduciary designated by the terms of the trust to perform
his or her duties as a trustee or other fiduciary of the trust.193
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the other fiduciaries to perform their duties. There is a corresponding
duty of trust advisors, trust protectors and each other fiduciary of the
trust to keep the trustee and other fiduciaries informed as well.194 Delaware adopted a similar provision in 2010, to which it added language
intended to obviate any inference that a recipient of such information
has a duty to monitor the provider. Delaware puts the burden on each
participant to request the desired information.195 South Dakota recently adopted a similar obligation on advisors to provide information
to an excluded fiduciary (but without a reciprocal duty).196
b. Compensation and Reimbursement
The UTC provides that if the trust does not otherwise specify, trustees (including co-trustees) are entitled to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.197 The Comment to § 708 states that

c. Liability
Under the UTC, a co-trustee is generally not liable for acts of another trustee.199 A number of state statutes provide that a co-trustee is
194
195

197
198
199

08/05/2011 14:05:14
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See infra Paragraph III.C.4.a; see infra note 195 and accompanying text.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §3317 (2011).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-13 (2011).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 708(a) (2005).
§ 708 cmt.
See § 703(f).
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The fact that a trust has more than one trustee does not mean
that the trustees together are entitled to more compensation
than had either acted alone. Nor does the appointment of
more than one trustee mean that the trustees are eligible to
receive the compensation in equal shares. The total amount of
the compensation to be paid and how it will be divided depends on the totality of the circumstances. Factors to be considered include the settlor’s reasons for naming more than one
trustee and the level of responsibility assumed and exact services performed by each trustee. Often the fees of co-trustees
will be in the aggregate higher than the fees for a single trustee
because of the duty of each trustee to participate in the administration and not delegate to a co-trustee duties the settlor expected the trustees to perform jointly. . . . The trust may also
benefit from the enhanced quality of decision-making resulting
from the collective deliberations of the trustees.198
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responsible, however, for the wrongful acts of a co-trustee to which he
consented or which his negligence permitted a co-trustee to commit.200
The UTC provides that a dissenting trustee who joins in an action
at the direction of the majority will not be liable if the trustee notifies
the co-trustees in writing of the dissent.201 However, even a written dissent will not be protected if the action of the trustees would constitute a
serious breach of trust.202
Other state statutes vary significantly on the issue of dissenting
trustee liability and, similar to common law, none address the actual
duties of the dissenting trustee. Some non-UTC states, like New York,
have statutes that relieve the dissenting trustee of liability but only with
prompt written dissent.203 Other states do not require dissent to be in
writing.204 Like the UTC, some states also do not limit liability for a
dissenting trustee who joins in an action of the majority, at their direction, if the action is a serious breach of trust.205
d. Vacancies
The UTC addresses the problem of what happens if one co-trustee
is no longer acting, an issue often overlooked in trust instruments. UTC
§ 704(b) provides that if one or more co-trustees remain in office, the
vacancy does not need to be filled.206 The New Hampshire statute on
co-trustees also specifically addresses vacancies. Like the UTC, it provides that if a vacancy occurs in a co-trusteeship, the remaining co-trustees may act for the trust.207
3. Directed Trustees
UTC Approach. Section 808 of the UTC outlines the role of a
modern directed trustee as well as their relationships to trust protectors,
trust advisors and other power holders. In contrast to the common law,
the UTC provides that the directed trustee must act in accordance with
a third party’s direction unless the attempted exercise “is manifestly

08/05/2011 14:05:14

200 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16402(b) (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68109(c) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-503 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-03
(2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-11 (2010).
201 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(h).
202 See id.
203 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-.20.7 (McKinney 2011); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3323 (a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-4 (2010).
204 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703(h) (2011).
205 See id.
206 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 704(b) (2005).
207 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-703 (2011).
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contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted
exercise would constitute a serious breach of fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.”208
Similarly to Section 185 of the Restatement (Second), the Comments to Section 808 distinguish a trustee’s duty when acting pursuant to
a power to direct versus a veto power. Under the former, the trustee
usually has no responsibility other than to carry out the direction when
made whereas under the latter, the trustee is responsible for initiating
the decision, subject to the third party’s approval so is more like a cotrustee.209
The Comments in UTC § 808 are also instructive with regard to the
limitation on the directed trustee’s responsibility for oversight. The
Comments state that
Powers to direct are most effective when the trustee is not deterred from exercising the power by fear of possible liability.
On the other hand, the trustee does have overall responsibility
for seeing that the terms of the trust are honored. For this reason, [Section 808(b)] imposes only minimal oversight responsibility on the trustee. A trustee must generally act in
accordance with the direction. A trustee may refuse the direction only if the attempted exercise would be manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the
attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of fiduciary duty owed by the holder of the power to the beneficiaries
of the trust.210

209
210
211
212

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 (b).
See § 808 cmt.
Id.
See id.
See § 808(b).
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The Comment to UTC § 808 goes on to recognize that the terms of
the trust may alter the directed trustee’s responsibilities by providing,
for example, that the trustee must accept the decision of the power
holder without question.211
As stated above, a directed trustee must follow the direction unless
the exercise is contrary to the terms of the trust or such trustee “knows”
that the attempted exercise would constitute a breach of trust.212
Knowledge of a fact is subject to broad imputation under UTC Section 104, and a directed trustee may have a duty of inquiry. A person
who (1) has actual knowledge of a matter; (2) has received a notice or
notification of it; or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known to
the person at the time in question, has reason to know it, that person
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will be deemed to have knowledge of the matter.213 The Comment to
UTC Section 104 even takes this a step further by stating that “as to
certain actions, a person is charged with knowledge of facts the person
would have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.”214
Statutory Approaches in Certain Non-Conforming UTC States.
Three UTC states, New Hampshire, Wyoming and Florida, have chosen
their own paths regarding directed trustees.
i. New Hampshire. New Hampshire’s recently enacted UTC amendments define trustees, protectors and advisors to all be “excluded fiduciaries” to the extent of any role for which they have not been given
responsibility by the trust instrument, agreement of the beneficiaries or
court order.215 An “excluded fiduciary” has no duty to review actions of
other trustees, trust advisors or trust protectors:
Other than this key addition of a two way exclusion of responsibility (advisors are also not responsible for the trustee’s or other advisors’
and protectors’ actions), the excluded fiduciary’s duties are similar to
those of a Delaware fiduciary following the directions of another (see
“Delaware’s Advisor Statute” below).216
ii. Wyoming. Wyoming provides that an excluded fiduciary is relieved
of any duty or responsibility to review the actions of a duly named and
appointed trust protector or trust advisor.217 An excluded fiduciary is a
fiduciary who acts in accordance with the direction of a trust protector
or trust advisor.218

If the terms of a trust instrument provide for the appointment
of more than one trustee but confer upon one or more of the
trustees, to the exclusion of the others, the power to direct or
prevent specified actions of the trustees, the excluded trustees
shall act in accordance with the exercise of the power. Except
in cases of willful misconduct on the part of the trustee with
the authority to direct or prevent actions of the trustees of
213

08/05/2011 14:05:14

See § 104(a).
§ 104 cmt.
215 Id.
216 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1204 (2011); see also infra notes 222-23 and
accompanying text.
217 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-715 (2010).
218 § 4-10-718(d).
219 See FLA. STAT. § 736.0703(9) (2011).
214

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 82 Side A

iii. Florida. Florida has adopted a directed trust statute that varies
from the foregoing in part by referring to both directed and directing
participants as “trustees.”219 The entire provision follows:
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which the excluded trustee has actual knowledge, an excluded
trustee is not liable, individually or as a fiduciary, for any consequence that results from compliance with the exercise of the
power, regardless of the information available to the excluded
trustees. The excluded trustees are relieved of any obligation
to review, inquire, investigate, or make recommendations or
evaluations with respect to the exercise of the power. The trustee or trustees having the power to direct or prevent actions of
the trustees shall be liable to the beneficiaries with respect to
the exercise of the power as if the excluded trustees were not
in office and shall have the exclusive obligation to account to
and to defend any action brought by the beneficiaries with respect to the exercise of the power.220

i. Delaware’s Advisor Statute. Delaware distinguishes between a fiduciary who follows the direction of an advisor and a fiduciary who is to
make a decision with the consent of any advisor.223 The statute clearly
states the limits of a directed fiduciary’s duties with regard to monitoring or advising the trust advisor. It also limits the directed fiduciary’s
duty to warn or communicate with the beneficiaries when such fiduciary
would have exercised discretion differently. With regard to a fiduciary
who is directed, the statute provides:
Id.
Id.
222 Richard Nenno, Directed Trusts: Can Directed Trustees Limit Their Liability?,
2006.2 NOTRE DAME TAX & EST. PLAN. INST. § RWN-18 (2006).
223 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b)-(c) (2011).
221
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This language demarking the liability of the directing and directed
trustee is so novel and complicated compared to other states’ that confusion on the part of participants may require judicial assistance to determine what was intended. The authors believe this could affect the
willingness of directed trustees to accept such trusts in Florida. Particularly troubling is the liability of a fiduciary with the “power to . . . prevent [wrongful] actions”221 of another fiduciary for failing to do so.
There is no indication as to what knowledge of pending wrongful actions
the first fiduciary must have to trigger a responsibility to prevent the
actions or what duty or authority that first fiduciary has to monitor the
other fiduciary or obtain information from the other fiduciary regarding
a proposed or pending wrongful action.
Statutory Approaches in Certain Non-UTC States. Some non-UTC
states have also enacted statutes explicitly recognizing directed trustees.
These jurisdictions include Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma and South Dakota.222
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Whenever a governing instrument provides that a fiduciary is
to follow the direction of an adviser with respect to investment
decisions, distribution decisions, or other decisions of the fiduciary, then, except to the extent that the governing instrument
provides otherwise, the fiduciary shall have no duty to:
(1) Monitor the conduct of the adviser;
(2) Provide advice to the adviser or consult with the adviser;
or
(3) Communicate with or warn or apprise any beneficiary or
third party concerning instances in which the fiduciary
would or might have exercised the fiduciary’s own discretion in a manner different from the manner directed by
the adviser.
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the actions of the fiduciary pertaining to matters within the scope of
the adviser’s authority (such as confirming that the adviser’s
directions have been carried out and recording and reporting
actions taken at the adviser’s direction), shall be presumed to
be administrative actions taken by the fiduciary solely to allow
the fiduciary to perform those duties assigned to the fiduciary
under the governing instrument and such administrative actions shall not be deemed to constitute an undertaking by the
fiduciary to monitor the adviser or otherwise participate in actions within the scope of the adviser’s authority.224

224
225

§ 3313(e)(1)-(3).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.553–.556 (2010).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

iii. South Dakota. South Dakota’s directed trust statute contains provisions similar to Nevada’s. In some instances, the Nevada and South
Dakota provisions are more specific than their counterparts found in
New Hampshire, but the greater specificity is limiting and creates some
ambiguity.

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 83 Side A

ii. Nevada’s Directed Trusts Statute. Effective October 1, 2009, Nevada
provided statutory authority for directed trusts and the appointment of
trust advisors and protectors, the powers that may be contained in a
trust instrument, and liability protection to excluded fiduciaries if the
trust instrument so provides.225 Nevada’s law creates no duty among
trust participants to keep each other informed.
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b. Compensation and Reimbursement
The UTC does not specifically address the issue of compensation
for a directed trustee. However, the general trustee compensation provision provides for compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.226 As noted above in the section on co-trustees, the Comment
to UTC Section 708 states that when there are multiple trustees, the
total amount of the compensation and how it will be divided depend on
the totality of the circumstances.227
State statutes that specifically address directed trustees generally do
not address the issue of compensation and reimbursement. It is instructive, however, to review the factors set forth in the Delaware statute
when the trust instrument does not specifically provide for compensation.228 Although this provision relates to “qualified trustees” (a person
authorized by Delaware or the United States to act as a trustee subject
to supervision of one of several oversight bodies), the factors could be
similarly applied to non-trustee participants to arrive at reasonable compensation. These factors include:

New Hampshire’s fiduciary compensation provisions address trustees, trust protectors and trust advisors. In general, they are entitled to
either “reasonable compensation under the circumstances” or the compensation provided in the trust instrument subject to being increased or
decreased by a court where there are equitable reasons to do so.230 Presumably the role of a directed trustee (excluded fiduciary) is a circumstance that will enter into the determination of the reasonableness of its
compensation.
226

228
229
230

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 708 (2005).
Id. at cmt.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3561(b) (2011).
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-708 (2011).
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1. The time spent or likely to be spent in administering a trust
of the type contemplated;
2. The risks and responsibilities involved;
3. The novelty and difficulty of the tasks required of the
trustee;
4. The skill and experience of the trustee;
5. Comparable charges of the trust services;
6. The character of the trust assets; and
7. The time constraints imposed upon the trustee in administering the trust.229
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Nevada’s new directed trusts statute does not state whether an advisor or protector may be compensated.231
c. Liability
The directed trustee is generally not liable for following the directions of the trust advisor or trust protector (absent such exercise being
contrary to the terms of the trust or knowing the exercise would be a
serious breach). However, as one knowledgeable commentator points
out, the directed trustee is not immune from attempts to hold it responsible for the actions of power holders.232
Disappointed beneficiaries have tried, generally unsuccessfully,
to hold a directed trustee responsible for investment losses.
Some of the allegations include the directed trustee failed to
follow the directions of the trust advisor, the trust advisor exceeded the trust advisor’s authority set forth in the trust instrument, the directed trustee breached the trustee’s duty to
supervise the actions of the trust advisor, and the directed trustee is responsible for the actions of the trust advisor as a cotrustee.233

i. Delaware. The Delaware advisor statute provides that when a fiduciary acts in accordance with a direction, then except in cases of willful
misconduct on the part of the fiduciary directed, the fiduciary shall not
be liable for any loss resulting from action.234 As noted earlier in this
article, this statute was recently invoked to successfully defend a claim
against a directed trustee in the unpublished Duemler case. In 2010,
Delaware added a definition of “willful misconduct” to clarify the limit

232
233
234

NEV. REV. STAT. § 13.163.553-.556 (2010).
Belcher, supra note 2.
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b) (2011).
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UTC Approach. As stated above, under UTC Section 808, the directed trustee must act in accordance with an exercise of power unless
the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or
the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious
breach of fiduciary duty. The duty of inquiry that appears to stem from
this provision could leave the directed trustee with potential liability.
Statutory Approaches in Certain Non-UTC or Non-Conforming
UTC States. Some non-UTC states, including Delaware and South Dakota, have enacted statutes explicitly relieving the directed trustee of
liability for following the direction of a power holder. Again, New
Hampshire and Wyoming have found a third way.
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on the liability of a directed fiduciary: “The term ‘willful misconduct’
shall mean intentional wrongdoing, not mere negligence, gross negligence or recklessness.”235
ii. South Dakota. South Dakota limits the liability of an excluded fiduciary. The provision, which is similar to the one adopted in New Hampshire, states that an excluded fiduciary is not liable either individually or
as a fiduciary, for (1) any loss that results from compliance with a direction of a trust advisor, (2) any loss that results from a failure to take any
action proposed by an excluded fiduciary that requires a prior authorization of the trust advisor if that excluded fiduciary timely sought but
failed to obtain that authorization, or (3) any loss that results from any
action or inaction except for gross negligence or willful misconduct,
when an excluded fiduciary is required for any reason to assume the role
of trust advisor.236 Any excluded fiduciary is also relieved from any obligation to perform investment reviews and make recommendations with
respect to any investments to the extent the trust advisor had authority
to direct the acquisition, disposition, or retention of any such
investment.237
iii. New Hampshire. New Hampshire’s limitation on the excluded fiduciary’s liability is broad and specific:

iv. Wyoming. Wyoming provides that unless the trust instrument
states otherwise, an excluded fiduciary is not liable for any loss resulting
from any action or inaction of the trust advisor or trust protector.239
v. Idaho. Idaho provides that if an instrument appoints a trust advisor
or a trust protector, an excluded fiduciary is not liable for any loss resulting from compliance with a direction of the trust advisor or from any
action taken upon the trust protector’s direction.240
235
237
238
239
240

§ 3301(g).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-2 (2010).
§ 55-1B-2.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1205 (2011).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-717 (2010).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(2) (2011).
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An excluded fiduciary is not liable for any loss resulting from
any action or inaction of a trust advisor or trust protector or
for any loss that results from the failure of a trust advisor or
trust protector to take any action proposed by the excluded
fiduciary that requires authorization of a trust advisor or trust
protector if the excluded fiduciary timely sought but failed to
obtain that authorization.238
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4. Trust Advisors/Investment Advisors/Investment Committees
a. Role, Responsibilities and Decision-Making
UTC Approach. In the comments to Section 808 of the UTC, the
term “advisor” is said to have long been used for certain trust functions,
such as “the power to direct investments or manage a closely-held business.”241 As described in the introduction to this section of the article,
the UTC treats any person, other than a beneficiary, with the power to
direct as a fiduciary.242 Such a person is thus required to act in good
faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries.
Statutory Approaches of Certain Non-Conforming or Non-UTC
States. A few states have attempted to outline some of the powers and
duties of a trust advisor generally, of which an investment advisor or
investment committee would be one type. At least one state (South Dakota) specifically addresses investment advisors.243
i. New Hampshire. “Trust advisor’’ means
any party whose appointment is provided for by the terms of
the trust and whose powers are defined . . . but excludes any
person who does not have the authority to direct or consent to
a fiduciary’s actual or proposed investment decision, distribution decision, or any other noninvestment decision or who does
not have any of the powers identified in RSA 564-B:7-711(c)
[addressing directed trusts].244

241
242
244
245
246
247
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UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (2005).
§ 808(d).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-9 (2010).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-103(27) (2011).
§ 564-B:12-1203.
See supra Subsection I.B.4 for the list from the statute.
See supra Paragraph III.C.2.a.
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The powers, duties and discretions of a trust advisor shall be expressly set forth in the trust instrument and may, in the best interests of
the beneficiaries, be exercised or not exercised in the sole and absolute
discretion of the trust advisor and shall be binding on all other
persons.245
An essentially unlimited range of powers may be given to a trust
advisor under the New Hampshire statute.246
New Hampshire in 2007 adopted a unique provision giving a trust
advisor a duty to inform and report to each excluded fiduciary. Mirroring the similar duty to inform of trustees,247 it provides as follows:

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 85 Side B

08/05/2011 14:05:14

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\36-4\ACT403.txt

834

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 66

2-AUG-11

10:44

[Vol. 36:769

A trust advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated
by the terms of the trust shall keep each excluded fiduciary
designated by the terms of the trust reasonably informed about
(1) the administration of the trust with respect to any specific
duty or function being performed by the trust advisor, trust
protector, or other fiduciary to the extent that the duty or function would normally be performed by the excluded fiduciary or
to the extent that providing such information to the excluded
fiduciary is reasonably necessary for the excluded fiduciary to
perform its duties and (2) any other material information that
the excluded fiduciary would be required to disclose to the
qualified beneficiaries under subsection (b) regardless of
whether the terms of the trust relieve the excluded fiduciary
from providing such information to qualified beneficiaries.
Neither the performance nor the failure to perform of a trust
advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated by the
terms of the trust as provided in this subsection shall affect the
limitation on the liability of the excluded fiduciary . . . .248
ii. South Dakota. South Dakota specifically defines an “investment
trust advisor” as “a fiduciary, given authority by the instrument to exercise all or any portions of the powers and discretions set forth in § 551B-10.”249
South Dakota has a statute that outlines the powers and discretions
specific to an “investment trust advisor”. It provides that

249
250

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:8-813(k) (2011).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-1(6) (2010).
§ 55-1B-10.
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The powers and discretions of an investment trust advisor . . .
are binding on any other person and any other interested
party, fiduciary, and excluded fiduciary. Unless the terms of
the document provide otherwise, the investment trust advisor
has the power to perform the following:
(1) Direct the trustee with respect to the retention, purchase,
sale, or encumbrance of trust property and the investment and
reinvestment of principal and income of the trust;
(2) Vote proxies for securities held in trust; and
(3) Select one or more investment advisors, managers, or
counselors, including the trustee, and delegate to them any of
its powers.250
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iii. Wyoming. Wyoming also has a statute very much like New Hampshire’s generally addressing the powers of a trust advisor.251
iv. Idaho. Idaho’s statute also is very much like New Hampshire’s regarding the powers of a trust advisor.252
b. Compensation and Reimbursement
The rights of an investment advisor or investment committee member to compensation and reimbursement is statutorily authorized under
New Hampshire law but the authors have not found a similar provision
in other states’ statutes.253 Any of the factors outlined in the Delaware
trustee compensation statute described above should apply in determining reasonable compensation.254 In general, compensation for investment advisors should be in proportion to the authority exercised and the
exposure to risk and should also be reasonable pursuant to the duty of
loyalty owed to the beneficiaries.
c. Liability

d. Vacancies
The result of vacancies in the office of trust advisors are not typically addressed in the states with trust advisor provisions with the exception of New Hampshire. The New Hampshire statute states that unless
251

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-712 (2010).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(10) (2011).
253 N.H. R E V . S T A T . A N N . § 564-B:7-708 (compensation); § 564-B:7-709
(reimbursement).
254 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3561(b) (2011).
255 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (2005).
256 Id.
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UTC Approach. UTC Section 808(d) provides that the holder of a
power to direct is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty. The Comment to that section also adds some clarity. It states
that “the holder of the power to direct is frequently acting on behalf of
others . . . the holder is presumptively acting in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to the powers granted and can be held liable if the holder’s conduct constitutes a breach of trust whether through action or inaction.”255
The power holder, however, has to have accepted the grant of power
either expressly or informally through the exercise of the power.256
Statutory Approach in Certain Non-Conforming and Non-UTC
States: There do not appear to be any specific statutes on the liability of
investment advisors other than those referencing trust advisors and already examined.

252
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the trust instrument provides otherwise, upon obtaining knowledge of a
vacancy in the office of trust advisor, the trustee shall be vested with any
fiduciary power or duty that otherwise would be vested in the trustee
but that by the terms of the trust were vested in the trust advisor until a
new trust advisor is appointed (either by the terms of the trust or by a
court).257 Moreover, unless the trust provides otherwise, upon obtaining knowledge of a vacancy in the office of trust protector, the trustee shall petition the court to fill the vacancy if the trustee determines
that the terms of the trust require the vacancy to be filled.258 A trustee,
however, shall not be liable for failing to exercise or assume any power
or duty held by a trust advisor and conferred upon the trustee by this
statute for the sixty day period immediately following the date the trustee obtains knowledge of such vacancy.259
5. Trust Protectors
States have statutorily approached trust protectors in three ways,
all defined by how their trust protector provisions relate to their trust
advisor or general power holder provisions. The three approaches are:

UTC/Restatement Approach. The UTC takes a combination of the
first and second approach, referencing only “power holders” in the actual code,260 and only making mention of trust protectors by comment.261 This is done in much the same way as in Section 64(2) of the
Restatement (Third).262
Statutory Approach in Certain Non-Conforming and Non-UTC
States: Many states (e.g., Delaware) fall under category 1 above: they
257
259
260
261
262

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-712(a) (2011).
§ 564-B:7-712(b).
§ 564-B:7-712(c).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b)-(d).
§ 808 cmt.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(2) (2003).
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a. Ignoring them, apparently deeming them to be adequately
addressed by the provisions of law addressing the broader
classes of trust advisors and/or power holders.
b. Substantially cloning the trust advisor/power holder provisions with the substitution of the word “trust protector”
for the participant identified in the corresponding
provisions.
c. Theoretically (although the authors have found none), by
adopting provisions that actually distinguish trust protectors from trust advisors and/or power holders in a meaningful way.
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do not have specific trust protector statutes and, instead, include trust
protectors within the broader group of trust advisors. A few states,
however, have statutes specifically referring to trust protectors (i.e.,
Alaska,263 Wyoming,264 Idaho,265 Michigan,266 Utah,267 South Dakota268 and New Hampshire269), but none of those the authors found
appear to allow powers to trust protectors not allowed to trust advisors
or limit the powers that may be given trust protectors to a subset of
those that can be given to trust advisors.
Since trust protectors are treated the same as trust advisors in all
these states, they also enjoy the same statutory rights. For instance,
under New Hampshire law, trust protectors like trust advisors are subject to New Hampshire’s duty to inform and report to the excluded fiduciary described earlier in this article and enjoy the right to be informed
by the trustee and other fiduciaries.270 New Hampshire also considers a
trust protector, like a trust advisor, to be a fiduciary and provides that
the statutory provisions applicable to trustees shall be applicable to trust
protectors, but only to the extent of the powers, duties and discretions
granted to trust protectors under the terms of the trust instrument.271
6. Discretionary Distribution Advisors/Discretionary Distribution
Committees

263

08/05/2011 14:05:14

ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370 (2010).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710 (2010).
265 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501 (2011).
266 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809 (2011) combines all participants with authority to
direct a trustee under the title “trust protector.” Trust protectors (other than beneficiaries who are trust protectors) are fiduciaries and must act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.
These provisions may not be modified by the trust instrument except that a settlor can
designate that certain administration powers described in I.R.C. § 675(4) can be held in a
nonfiduciary capacity. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7105(h) (2011).
267 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(e)(iv) (2010).
268 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6 (2010).
269 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-103(28) (2011).
270 See supra Subsection III.C.2.
271 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202 (2011).
272 II Scott, supra note 48, § 185; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (2005).
264
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Very few state statutes appear to address specifically distribution
advisors and committees. There is, however, little about these types of
trust participants to distinguish their duties, rights and liabilities from
those of power holders acting on behalf of beneficiaries or the broadlydefined trust advisors and trust protectors.272 Accordingly, UTC provisions and state statutes described above governing these more broadlydefined trust participants also should apply to non-trustees exercising
distribution powers.
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The only example of a statute that the authors have found taking
specific note of distribution participants is South Dakota’s law bolstering the authority of trust-designated distribution advisors.273
The South Dakota statute provides,
The powers and discretions of a distribution trust advisor shall
be provided in the trust instrument and may be exercised or
not exercised, in the best interests of the trust, in the sole and
absolute discretion of the distribution trust advisor and are
binding on any other person and any other interested party,
fiduciary, and excluded fiduciary. Unless the terms of the document provide otherwise, the distribution trust advisor shall direct the trustee with regard to all discretionary distributions to
beneficiaries.274
7. Trustee Removers and Appointers
Trustee removers and appointers are really just a subset of trust
protectors and would therefore be subject to the same principles as
noted above for trust protectors though the duties would reflect the
more limited authority granted to the trust remover or appointer.
IV. GUIDANCE FOR CREATING WELL-FUNCTIONING
MULTI-PARTICIPANT TRUSTS

274

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-11 (2010).
Id.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

273

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 87 Side B

The trend toward multiple fiduciaries has evolved for many important reasons, ranging from an increasingly complex investment world requiring specialized advisors to a settlor’s desire to maximize control by
his family over trust functions to the extent possible. Since this trend
seems likely to continue, practitioners need to advise settlors on both
the positive and negative features of multi-participant trusts.
At their best, multi-participant trusts allow the settlor to precisely
allocate functions to those individuals or organizations that he or she
believes will provide the best decision-making and administration for
the trust and its beneficiaries and optimize his ability to take advantage
of the best trust and tax laws for the trust. Once a settlor has decided to
pursue this approach, the practitioner (and the settlor’s other advisors)
needs to determine how to achieve the settlor’s goals for an effective,
well-coordinated and efficient team of trust participants.
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A. Rely on Common Law, Statutes or Drafting?

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b).
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Our review of current common law and statutory law showed broad
movement toward recognizing directed trusts and the existence of multiple trust participants. The Restatement’s new positions and comments
on directed trusts and power holders, the UTC provision on directed
trusts and the more customized and developed statutes on directed
trusts specifically recognizing multiple trust participants have significantly moved the legal context forward. However, even the best and
newest statutes (i.e., New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wyoming and Delaware) do not address most of the twelve items that the
authors identified in Part II of this article as necessary for successful
management of a multi-participant trust.
The new statutes have been critical in validating the authority of
the newer trust participants, their default duties and liabilities and other
matters, but the statutes have not successfully addressed all of the issues
(e.g., coordination between trust participants; filling vacancies), and if
they attempt to, it is unlikely that their choices for coordinating participants will be seen as the best choice by all or even most settlors and
their counsel. It may in fact be undesirable to have very detailed statutes governing how multi-participants must manage their responsibilities (other than by creating defaults) since settlors and their families that
use multi-participant trusts generally want the flexibility to customize
their trusts regarding the scope of authority and duties given to trust
participants, their relationships to each other and their liability.
Still, selecting a jurisdiction with favorable statutes, almost
mandatory when using a directed trust arrangement, can help limit the
directed trustee’s liability for following such directions275. At the very
least it is fair for practitioners to expect—and look as far afield as necessary for laws that provide—certainty as to the duties of the participants
and laws that clearly allow a trust instrument to rearrange those duties
in whatever fashion the settlor and her counsel deem optimal for achieving the settlor’s goals, including the proper administration of her trust.
In the end the authors believe that most of the burden in creating
multi-participant trusts that meet settlor’s objectives will always fall on
trust counsel who, though mindful of state law, may rely very little on it
to supplement his drafting. This is not just because the law currently is
too incomplete to provide much of a supplement. It is also because tacitly weaving the law’s provisions into a trust is likely always to remain
more time-consuming and expensive than writing a comprehensive document that supplies every critical component for making a multi-participant trust perform as intended.
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As stated earlier, despite the recent statutory efforts, trust counsel
must determine (a) the exact duties of each trust participant, (b) the
standards that should apply to them, (c) their liability for losses to the
trust or beneficiaries arising from any failure to fulfill an assigned duty,
and (d) how the participants should work together. Our review of the
common law and statutory law has shown that the only way to make
these determinations with an adequate degree of confidence as to the
outcome is still to specify exactly what is desired in the trust instrument
and make sure those provisions will be governed by the laws of a state
that lets the instrument override contrary state law.
1. Achieving Clarity as to the Legal and Risk Parameters of a
Multi-Participant Trust
The authors have posited that trust counsel must meet in the trust
instruments twelve requirements to create a well-functioning multi-participant trust. The twelve began with the five items, reproduced here,
that must be determined and made clear to trust participants and settlors in order for them to understand the legal environment and risk
parameters applicable to participants’ roles.

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 88 Side B
08/05/2011 14:05:14

(a) Where the trust will be administered and therefore the
law of administration (which must be ascertained despite
trust participants located or acting in multiple states).
(b) Whether each non-trustee participant is a fiduciary or not
and whether a fiduciary or not, certainty as to
(i) the standard, if any, for the performance of its responsibilities and whether losses due to a failure to
meet that standard attract liability; and
(ii) what if any duties of trustees adhere to his or her
assigned responsibilities.
(c) The potential liability, if any, of the trustee or a non-trustee participant for the known or unknown acts or omissions of another participant.
(d) Whether a trustee or non-trustee participant must follow
a direction provided by another participant within the
scope of the other’s responsibilities under the trust instrument but which the receiver knows, reasonably believes
or should have known would violate the instrument, law
or the direction giver’s or the receiver’s fiduciary
responsibility.
(e) More generally, whether a directed trustee is relieved of
any responsibility with respect to a function assigned to a
non-trustee participant other than to follow that participant’s directions.
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Given the state of the law, trust counsel can achieve the desired
certainty as to each of the foregoing items only by providing in the trust
instrument detailed provisions as to the powers, rights, duties and responsibilities of each trust participant.
To the extent that the provisions he writes are inconsistent with
state law, he must confirm that the intent of the settlor as expressed in
the trust instrument will prevail under applicable law over conflicting
common law or statutory provisions. If this is unclear under state law,
he will need to advise the settlor and possibly certain participants as to
the risk of affected trust provisions not operating as intended. He
should also consider whether he can change the law (e.g., through drafting, use of out-of-state participants and/or the taking of actions out-ofstate) that will be applicable to the trust.
2. Defining Who is and Who is Not a Fiduciary

Sterk, supra note 72.
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Current law indicates clearly that multiple trust participants are fiduciaries absent a specific waiver of this relationship by the settlor in the
trust instrument. It is possible for trust counsel to make arguments on
both sides of the issue as to whether she should make each non-trustee
participant a fiduciary both from a duty and a liability standpoint, albeit
in either case limited to the scope of the participant’s authority.
The primary arguments in favor of limiting the duties and liability
of non-trustee participants are based on concerns that individuals and
institutions will be unwilling to act in such roles if they are deemed fiduciaries or as fiduciaries are exposed to liability for their mistakes or
omissions. Nevertheless, it seems to us that some level of fiduciary responsibility by these participants is usually desirable. A trust protector,
for example, may have an important role of monitoring the activities of
the trustee or choosing a successor, but who is monitoring the protector
that has been given these broad powers? If the protector is fully exculpated from liability, as is often the case, is there any check at all on the
protector’s exercise of power or failure to perform?
While limited or no liability of the trust protector may be fine if she
is a close advisor or relative of the settlor, the long term nature of many
trusts today makes it less likely that such a dynamic will exist over the
full term of the trust.276 If despite being informed as to the risks of
limiting or eliminating a trust participant’s duties and liability, the settlor desires to treat a non-trustee participant as a non-fiduciary, the trust
language doing so should be clear and unambiguous. A possible provision could look as follows:
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“Each trustee is a fiduciary. No other person who acts under
this instrument as an investment advisor, distribution committee member, trust protector or in some other office (collectively, “trust participants”) is a fiduciary. A trust participant
who is not a fiduciary need not consider the interests of the
beneficiaries in exercising the powers of his or her office.”
3. Clarifying Standards and Duties of Each Trust Participant
Clear delineation among trust participants must exist as to their various standards, duties and responsibilities. Everyone must know what
role they play and what duties and responsibilities they have. Moreover,
nothing can fall through the cracks: exceptional care must be taken to
make sure that all trust functions have been assigned to someone or
there must be a “default fiduciary” who has all powers and responsibilities not otherwise expressly assigned.
For the sake of smooth administration when dealing with multiple
trust participants, it may be helpful for the drafting attorney to actually
chart out all of the trust participants in a given trust and their roles and
duties.
4. Limits to Liability for Directed Trustees and Other Trust
Participants? Also, Exculpation, Indemnification or
Neither?

277

See supra Subsection III.C.3 for a discussion of directed trustee statutes.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

“It being the intention of the settlor that, in the absence of
actual fraud or gross negligence, each protector will be free
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In states with directed trustee statutes, the directed trustee has no
liability for following the power holder’s direction absent only such
things as knowledge that the attempted exercise would be manifestly
contrary to the terms of the trust or knowledge that the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of fiduciary duty owed by the
holder of the power to the beneficiaries of the trust.277
The issue of a power holder’s liability, however, is generally not
addressed other than acknowledging the power holder’s status as a fiduciary at least within the scope of his or her authority. This creates the
potential for liability for the power holder. Whether or not a trust participant is considered a fiduciary under statute or common law, however, the trust instrument can override that to the extent permitted by
state law and can also limit the liability of both the trustee and nontrustee participants. Whether a limitation is wise is another matter
which has already been commented upon in Subsection 2 above.
A sample provision limiting liability might look like the following:
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from any liability whatsoever relating to the protector’s acts or
failures to act as protector or the acts or failures to act of other
office holders.”
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278 See, e.g., Barnett v. Barnett, 424 So.2d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
trustee who made honest errors of judgment in good faith is protected by exculpatory
clause); Donato v. Bank of Boston, N.A., 110 F.Supp.2d 42 (D. R.I. 2001) (finding lack of
diversification protected by exculpation clause); but see In re Trusteeship of Williams, 591
N.W.2d 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“[e]xculpatory clauses are generally not favored by
the law and are strictly construed against the benefited party. Moreover, if the exculpatory clause is either ambiguous in scope or attempts to release the benefited party from
liability for intentional, willful or wanton acts, the clause will not be enforced.”); McNeil
v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding exculpation clause not a defense for a
claim of gross negligence).
279 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
280 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 108 (2005).
281 Id.

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 90 Side A

It is also worth considering whether an entity such as a limited liability company should be considered for a trust participant to act under
as a means to limit the participants’ exposure to risk. Another consideration is whether insurance can be obtained economically to provide coverage for potential claims against the various trust participants. An
errors and omissions policy is likely to be the best fit but the cost for
such policies may be very high in light of the corporate abuse cases of
recent years.
There is also the issue of exculpation or indemnification. Exculpation clauses can be drafted into trusts if appropriate. Although there is
some common law precedent restricting the usefulness of exculpation
clauses, they can be helpful in reducing the liability exposure for the
various trust participants.278 However, they should be used carefully
and with trust participants who meet high standards. The use of exculpation clauses has also been considered by some treatises, which generally support their use but not in the case of bad faith, reckless
indifference to the interests of the beneficiary or liability for any profit
the trustee has derived from a breach.279
The UTC and some state statutes have also addressed the validity
of exculpation clauses. The UTC states that a trust provision is invalid if
it relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad
faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the
interests of the beneficiaries or was inserted as a result of an abuse by
the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relationship with the settlor.280
While using an exculpation clause governed by the UTC can provide some useful protection to trust participants, especially those with
limited roles, the clause must be fair and adequately communicated to
the settlor.281 A few states also have non-UTC statutes that address
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exculpatory clauses, usually outlining restrictions to their use in the
same way as common law282 but in some cases completely rejecting their
use as “contrary to public policy.”283 So a careful review of the applicable state law is mandatory before using such clauses in the governing
instrument.
Indemnification may also be considered a remedy that can be
drafted into a trust. Sample indemnification language follows:
“Any person who at any time is or has been a protector shall
be indemnified out of the trust fund against any losses, liabilities, claims, costs and expenses incurred in connection with the
fulfilling, or purported failure to fulfill, the office of protector,
except in the case of his or her actual fraud or gross
negligence.”
5. Creating an Effective Multi-Participant Trust Management
Structure; The Private Trust Company Analogy

08/05/2011 14:05:14

282 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 633A.4505 (2011) (disallowing exculpation clauses inserted in the trust that results from an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship with the settlor); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16461 (2011) (finding exculpation
clause ineffective with regard to intentional breaches of trust, gross negligence, bad faith,
reckless indifference and as a result of an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship
with the settlor.)
283 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7 (McKinney 2010).
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An effective multi-participant trust requires an effective participant
coordination, governance and management structure. Before reviewing
the seven structural components that comprise our final seven requirements for an effective multi-participant trust, we suggest that trust counsel consider the structure of a type of trustee that may provide a useful
analogue for a multi-participant trust structure. The trustee in question
is the smallest and most streamlined corporate trustee—a private trust
company.
A private trust company may have as few as five people involved
and yet to perform its fiduciary functions prudently, will put in place two
or three committees, a hierarchical officer structure, and a trust policy
and procedure manual. The bulk of that manual will generally shape
the delivery of fiduciary services through the efforts of multiple individuals as opposed to an individual trustee or trust officer.
Certainly not all the infrastructure of a private trust company is
necessary to allow the safe and efficient administration of a single multiparticipant trust. However, the private trust company analogue does
show how in one context the organizational challenges are addressed
that trust counsel must deal with in order to assure that multiple participants work effectively together.
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6. A Multi-Participant Trust Governance Structure.
The following seven components are those we deem necessary for a
multi-participant trust structure with effective participant coordination,
governance and management.
(a)

Communication among the fiduciary participants as to,
among other things, what they have done, what they have
been told by beneficiaries or others, the assets in the trust
from time to time and, in particular, the distributions requested, approved or made or an election to convert to a
unitrust or exercise a power to adjust.

The trust instrument should require participants to communicate
with appropriate other participants what is necessary or helpful for implementation of the trust.284
(b)

Coordination among the trust participants such as speaking with a consistent voice to beneficiaries, investing and
liquidating assets according to the liquidity needs of the
trust for expenditures and distributions, taking a consistent view as to the legal obligations of the trust to beneficiaries and others or the tax obligations of the trust.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

284 This topic is further discussed in Subsection IV.A.8, Information Sharing and Reporting Among Multiple Trust Participants, infra.
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As we have observed throughout this article, when there is only a
single trustee and no other participants with duties assigned directly by
the trust instrument, there is no need for a trust management or governance structure. The trustee calendars what needs to be done and does it
or delegates it to someone else and monitors and supervises their
performance.
This is not true in a multi-participant trust. Each participant must
of course know his responsibilities and perform them, but he also must
coordinate or be coordinated with the other participants. Tasks involving multiple participants must be initiated, moved along, completed and
the results delivered or reported to someone else. In other words there
must be structure and process unless every participant can always be
relied on to do his job spontaneously and on schedule and without assured knowledge of what other participants have done or are planning.
Coordination can be achieved not only through communication but
also through a committee of the participants and a mechanism for them
to make decisions or by granting coordinating authority to one participant. Such “Coordinating authority” does not necessarily mean authority to direct any other participant but would include the authority to
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schedule meetings, notify participants of required actions and follow up
on inaction.
(c)

Filling vacancies in trust participant positions and determining who if anyone must perform a vacant participant’s
functions pending appointment of a successor.

Many multi-participant trusts cannot perform important discretionary and administrative tasks without the participation of key non-trustee
participants. A failure to act or vacancy can cripple trust operations and
send fiduciaries or beneficiaries to court. A mechanism for filling the
vacancy and allowing someone to act on an interim basis can prevent
such a breakdown.285
(d)

Time limits for a trust participant to exercise an approval
or veto right or obligation, and whether after the expiration of such time, the action will be deemed approved or
vetoed.

One means, short of coercion, to prevent a multi-participant trust
from breaking down when one participant fails to timely act is to impose
time limits on how long she has to act after being notified (e.g., by the
trustee) to do so and let her failure to act in that time be deemed to
constitute approval or disapproval. Constituting approval favors moving forward; constituting disapproval is only desirable if the settlor
wants no action to be taken without the approval of that protector or
advisor, even if the non-approval is due to the participant’s nonfeasance.
(e)

Obviously, it is important for trust counsel to be clear on who must
initiate an action and who must approve, consent to, or not veto it.
Also, if more than two participants must act on it, the trust instrument
should state whether majority rules or some other rule of collective decision-making applies.
A sample provision for majority decision-making follows:

285

See infra Subsection IV.A.9 for further discussion of vacancies.

08/05/2011 14:05:14

Unless otherwise provided herein, at any time when more than
two protectors are acting hereunder, none of whom is incapacitated, the decision or action of a majority of the protectors
shall be as effective as if made or taken by all protectors. If
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When more than one participant has the power to act or
decide on a matter, certainty as to whether action must be
taken unanimously, by majority vote or by any one of the
empowered participants, and whether a dissenting participant need do more than voice an objection to the other
participants to protect himself/herself from liability.
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only two protectors are acting hereunder, neither of whom is
incapacitated, then the protectors must act jointly.
(f) Expeditious, competent and final out-of-court resolution
of any disagreement among trust participants.
Deadlocks and other negative impacts can arise from disagreements among participants. Thought should be given to out-of-court resolutions by such means as appointment of a mediator or arbitrator or
granting a participant not a party to the disagreement the power to resolve it.
(g)

Certainty as to the amount of compensation and reimbursement of expenses, if any, the non-trustee participants are entitled to receive.

This is necessary to administration only in the sense that uncertainty about compensation or reimbursement can lead to premature exits by participants. A sample compensation provision for a protector,
though one that does not address the issue of who is to approve of compensation, follows:
Each protector shall be reimbursed for all reasonable expenses
incurred in fulfilling the office of protector, and each protector
shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation for his or
her services, out of the trust fund and such compensation shall
be paid without diminution of or charging the same against the
compensation of the trustee.

The range of topics discussed above—voting, vacancies, resolution
of disagreements, compensation for services, informal actions and actions by meeting and inter-party communications—puts one in mind of
a corporate structure, reinforcing the analogy to the private trust company. One implication is that the trust counsel addressing these issues
might look to corporate or other bylaws for models for organizing the
activities of multiple participants in an enterprise.
8. Information Sharing and Reporting Among Multiple Trust
Participants

08/05/2011 14:05:14

Other than New Hampshire’s innovative statute and Delaware’s
and South Dakota’s modified versions of it, there is no statutory provision or apparent case law addressing the issue of the need for various
trust participants to share the information necessary for each of them to
fulfill his individual and their joint duties and responsibilities under the
trust. In every well-functioning system of people there exists some
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mechanism by which each individual receives in a timely way the information she needs to perform her job or responsibility. The traditional
trustee approach never needed to address this since the trustee was fully
responsible for all of the functions of trust administration. In a multiparticipant approach, this, of course, is not the case.
The investment advisor, for example, must provide adequate information on a regular basis about the performance and current status of
the trust assets to the directed trustee and other non-trustee participants
in order for them to be able to perform their own jobs (e.g., determine
discretionary distributions, pay taxes, and communicate with beneficiaries). Insufficient information sharing can bring trust administration
to a grinding halt.
Unless the trust is governed by the laws of a state that addresses
whether or not there is a duty to share information between multiple
trust participants, the decisions must either be mutually arrived at
among the participants outside of the trust instrument or drafted into
the trust instrument. A system for effective communications between
trust participants should be formalized. In some cases, this may rise to a
duty to communicate.
In Subsection III.C.2, we described New Hampshire’s legislativelycreated duty to inform. The statute provides language which, if desired,
could be used in trust drafting to create a duty to inform and report:

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:8-813(k) (2011).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

286
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A trust advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated
by the terms of the trust shall keep each excluded fiduciary
designated by the terms of the trust reasonably informed about
(1) the administration of the trust with respect to any specific
duty or function being performed by the trust advisor, trust
protector, or other fiduciary to the extent that the duty or function would normally be performed by the excluded fiduciary or
to the extent that providing such information to the excluded
fiduciary is reasonably necessary for the excluded fiduciary to
perform its duties and (2) any other material information that
the excluded fiduciary would be required to disclose to the
qualified beneficiaries under subsection (b) regardless of
whether the terms of the trust relieve the excluded fiduciary
from providing such information to qualified beneficiaries.
Neither the performance nor the failure to perform of a trust
advisor, trust protector, or other fiduciary designated by the
terms of the trust as provided in this subsection shall affect the
limitation on the liability of the excluded fiduciary.286
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Even for Delaware trusts, a similar provision should be considered
since under Delaware’s new duty to inform, the burden is on the wouldbe recipient to ask for the information, and he may not even be aware
that important information exists.287 In contrast, the party in possession
of the information should be aware of its importance to the administration of the trust and should, in our view, have the duty to provide it
without being asked for it.
Trust counsel may also want to consider inserting guidelines on how
regularly information should be shared. Another consideration is
whether some limits on sharing particular information, such as deliberations of the directed trustee, distribution advisor or distribution committee regarding discretionary distributions, should be imposed. Such a
provision might look as follows:
“The trustee shall provide the protector such information and
reports relating to the management and administration of the
trust fund, or otherwise in respect of this trust agreement, as
the trustee shall determine to be necessary or desirable in order to enable the protector to fulfill the office of the protector.
The protector shall not be entitled to receive, and the trustee
may but shall not be required to disclose to the protector any
information regarding deliberations of the trustee relating to
the exercise or non-exercise of the powers, authorities and discretions conferred upon the trustee by law or by this
agreement.”
9. Vacancies, Succession, Incapacity

287 Delaware’s new duty to inform only applies if a co-fiduciary requests such information. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3317 (2011).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

In a multi-participant trust, trust administration can come to a complete halt if one or more participants resigns, dies, becomes incapacitated or even is removed and not replaced. If the instrument is silent, it
becomes unclear whether anyone has responsibility to fill the vacancy or
assume the functions of the former participant either temporarily until
the vacancy is filled or permanently.
One way that a vacancy can occur is through a participant failing to
accept the responsibilities of his or her role. In the authors’ experience,
it is rare to obtain a written commitment to perform their roles from
non-trustee participants. A participant not being bound to act could be
a disaster, such as where a trust protector is only called upon to act for
the first time in a crisis situation and declines to accept the responsibility. Thought should be given to requiring in the instrument that the first
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and all future incumbents in non-trustee participant roles undertake in
writing (such as by signing the trust instrument) to perform their role
until a written resignation is delivered to the trustee.
The authors were unable to find any specific provisions dealing with
the succession of non-trustee participants other than those provided in
the recent New Hampshire statute288 described in Subsection III.C.4 of
this article. A vacancy/succession provision should consciously address
(or not address) a broad range of issues, some of which are covered in
the New Hampshire statute, but others of which are not. The range of
issues includes the following:

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:7-712 (2011).

08/05/2011 14:05:14

288
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(a) Providing for succession of the multiple trust participants.
(b) If a vacancy is not filled then, upon obtaining knowledge
of the vacancy, giving the trustee or another trust participant the power to appoint a successor or directing that
they petition a court to fill the vacancy.
(c) Vesting the trustee or other trust participant with any
fiduciary power or duty held by the former trust participant until a new trust participant is appointed (either by
the terms of the trust or by a court).
(d) Suspending liability for a certain period (e.g., sixty days
after knowledge of a vacancy) if the trustee or other trust
participant assumes any power or duty held by the former
trust participant until the vacancy is filled.
(e) Provide that a resigning trust participant give notice to all
of the trustees and any other relevant trust participants.
(f) Provide when a vacancy in the office of a trust participant
need not be filled (e.g., in the case of an advisor committee member).
(g) Provide that successor trust participants are vested with
all the powers and discretions of the preceding trust participant.
(h) Waive all liability for the successor trust participant for
the acts and omissions of the prior trust participant
including any loss or expense.
(i) Consider tax sensitive powers with regard to succession
and include any prohibitions on who can act in order to
avoid a trust participant being viewed for tax purposes as
holding a general power of appointment.
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Whether a resigning participant has any fiduciary duties
associated with the timing or circumstances of resigning
and whether court approval is required or should be considered.

(b) Incapacity
A related issue is incapacity among the multiple trust participants.
Who is responsible for determining incapacity? What happens if a trust
participant becomes incapacitated? Sample text from an offshore trust,
drafted by one of the authors, provides as follows:

30565-act_36-4 Sheet No. 94 Side A
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Incapacity. The “Incapacity” of any individual hereunder, including, but not limited to, a protector or the beneficiary, shall
be determined as follows:
The “Incapacity” of an individual shall commence, and he or
she shall be deemed to be “Incapacitated” upon the receipt by
the trustee of (i) a certificate signed by two qualified examining physicians (a “Physicians’ Certificate”) stating that such individual is unable to act prudently or effectively because of
accident, physical or mental deterioration or other similar
cause or (ii) a copy of the order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction declaring such individual to be incapacitated.
Such Incapacity shall be deemed to continue unless or until the
trustee receives (x) in the case of any Incapacity resulting from
the trustee’s receipt of a Physicians’ Certificate, a certificate to
the contrary signed by two qualified examining physicians, or
(y) in the case of any judicially determined Incapacity, a copy
of the order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction declaring such individual no longer to be incapacitated.
The trustee shall have no duty to inquire as to the legal capacity or Incapacity of any protector, nor shall the trustee be required to initiate any examination or judicial proceeding to
determine whether any individual is Incapacitated or to keep
itself informed as to the physical or mental condition of any
protector or as to whether he or she is able to exercise his or
her free will, and the trustee shall not make any inference as to
the potential Incapacity of any protector by reason of his or
her investment or management advice or directions and may
assume that no condition exists which might lead to a determination that a protector is Incapacitated unless expressly informed in writing to the contrary. The trustee shall be entitled
(at the expense of the trust fund) to make such inquiries concerning the capacity or Incapacity of any protector as it may
from time to time in its sole and absolute discretion consider
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appropriate, and the trustee shall not be liable for any action
taken in good faith or omitted to be taken in good faith in pursuit of such inquiries.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have reviewed the problem of assuring that multiparticipant trusts will fulfill their promise by working as intended. In
order to do so, they must strike an appropriate balance between settlors’
original aims, the evolving interests of the beneficiaries the trusts are
intended to further, and the need of the trust participants charged with
implementing the trusts for well-defined, readily-understandable roles
they can perform competently and efficiently without uncertain or excess exposures to liability.
We have described in detail the requisite elements of a well-functioning multi-participant trust. There are only three sources for supplying those elements: (a) state trust law—both common and statutory, (b)
the trust instrument, and as a last resort, (c) a court order to clarify or
supplement the first two—hopefully not in a lawsuit seeking damages
from a participant.
We have shown that many issues have been addressed by some
states’ laws but no state has addressed them all. Even where addressed,
most settlors will not approve of all of a state’s solutions. Therefore,
only the trust instrument can supply any elements that remain missing
or reverse unsatisfactory state rules, but it can only do so if trust counsel
selects a state whose laws satisfy three criteria:

08/05/2011 14:05:14

Having invoked a favorable state’s laws, the final and most demanding job of trust counsel remains: to furnish in the trust instrument
every other element that she determines to be requisite to a well-functioning, multi-participant trust in order that the trust will fulfill the settlor’s purposes, further the best interests of the beneficiaries consistent
with those purposes, and reasonably limit the risks to the fiduciary assets and the trust participants.
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1. The law boasts the strong directed trustee statute necessary to underpin the whole concept of a multi-participant
trust.
2. It also explicitly authorizes settlors to supply in the trust
instrument all essential elements missing from state law or
preferred by the settlor over state law provisions.
3. The state’s laws provide whatever other state law features
trust counsel deems important to the purposes of the trust
or to reinforce the desired allocation of duties and liabilities among trust participants.
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